Margin requirement and the stock market by Casey, Robert B
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1958
Margin requirement and the stock
market
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/7829
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
College of Business Administration 
THESIS 
Margin Requirements and The Stock Market 
by 
Robert B· Casey 
(B·S· in B·A· College of The Holy Cross 1954) 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF B USI ~lESS ADMINISTRATION 
1958 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPrER 
I I NTRODUCTION . . .. . . . .. . . . ~ ....................... . 
PAGE 
7 
Pl..lr' pe>s e of Study • • . • • • . • • • • • . • . • • • • . . • • • • • • • • • 8 
Bourrla.ries.................................... 9 
Investigation and Research •• ~ • .. •••. . •••••.••• 10 
Previous 'V~om in This Area ••••..••••••••.••••• 11 
II HOW I MPORTANT ARE MARGIN REQUIREMENTS'? 
Credit and the Stock Market •••• . . •••••.••••.•• 14 
Margin Requirements Defined •••••• . ••••.••••••• 18 
Be. a i c Rule a Gov er ni ng Mar gi ns • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 19 
Advantage of Maintaining More Than 
Required Margin . ...... ~ ....... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 22 
Credit and Margin Requirements •••••..•.••••••• 23 
Number of Accounts Involved in the Market ••••• 24 
Beliefs of Margin Traders. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 27 
Grit icis m of Margin Trading. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 28 
Comparison With Credit Purchases and 
Shorl Sales ..................................• 29 
III HOW MUCH CREDIT IS ACTUALLY INVOLVED IN THE 
STOCK MARKET? 
cus t omers 1 Debit Balances and Money Borrowed •• 32 
Trend of Credi~ in the Market •••..•.•••.• . •••• 33 
Best Brake on Stock Market Credit ••••••••• . •.• 38 
General Availability of Credit and the 
StookMarket··········· ~ ····· · ················ 41 
Eff ects of an I nc r ease in Credit ••••• • .•••.•.• 42 
Degree of Restraint ••••.••••••••••••..••• ~ • • • • 4~ 
-· 
Selective and Effective Cred it Regulation ••••• 44 
2 
CHAPTER PAGE 
-·--
IV HC:W EFFECTIVE HAVE MARGIN REQUIREMENTS BEEN 
IN CURBING .SfEC"\]IATION? _ 
Previous Attempts at Selective Control ••••••• 48 
Backgrourrl. to Era-Pre 1929.... . . • • • . . . • • • . • • • 52 
Mar gin Credit in 1929 • • • • . . . • • • • • • • • . • . . . . • • • 54 
Inaugurat-ion by SEC •• , • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 57 
Original Formula~ • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • • • . . • • • • . • • • • 59 
Critics of the 100 Per Cent Market;•.. .. ...... 61 
Factors Within the Economy.... . • • • . . • • • • • • • • • 64 
Reduction in Requirements........... . . . ...... 66 
V ARE MARGIN REQUJREMENTS GOOD FOR THE lJiffiOLE 
ECONOMY'? . 
Reasons Behind Credit controls on Stocks ••••• 69 
Effects Upon the Economy..................... '11 
Background Surrounding Changes in Margin 
Requirements 1934-1945 ••••••••••••••••••• · . • • • 72 
Background Surrourrli ng Changes in Margin 
Requirements 1946-1958....................... 74 
Suggested Improvements am Modifications..... 76 
VI WBAT STATISTICS ARE AVAIIABU: CONCERNING CREDIT 
AND . THE _EFFECTS OF MARGIN CHANGES? 
SEC Studies snd Difficulties Involved....... 83 
Public Transaction Studies-rrYSE·............ 85 
Research Memorandum-1~SE···················· 88 
Other Factors Involved................. • • • • • 101 
Close of t ~ Bull Market •••• , . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 103 
3 
CHAPI'ER PAGE 
-
VII WHAT ARE SOME OF THE CURRENT PRACTICES 
J;NVOLVED I~ PURCHASING S'l'OCKS .ON CREDIT? 
.. ~ - - . 
Enforcement of SEC Rules................... 106 
Interviews With Brokers..................... 108 
Preparation and Results of 
Questionrl.B.~es.............................. 116 
VIII CONCLUSION· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • · • • • • • • • • 125 
Volume and Trading Activity ••••••••••••••••• 
Margins e. n:l the Number of Margin Accounts ••• 
135 
140 
4 
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE· • • • • •• •. • • ••• • ••••••...••.••••• 144-148 inc. 
BIBLI OG RA,._Pli.Y •••• • • • • • • • • • • ••• • •••••••••••••••••••••• 149 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE PAGE 
I Margin Requirement Changes Since 1934 .••••••••• 17 
!I customers' Net Debit Balances, Free Credit 
Balances and the Market Value of New York 
Stock Excha nge Lis ted Stocks Selected Years.... 35 
III Total Net Borrowing on Collateral of Members 
of the New York Stock Exchange for Selected 
Da. tes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 
IV Borrowing by Members of tre New Yor k Stock 
ExChange for Selected Dates 1926-1950 Inc. 
and for Selected Years 1935-1956 Inc. ·····~··· 39 
V Purcll.ases an:l Sales of Margin Accrunts Aft er 
3 Marg i n Changes for 1945 & 1946 ••••••••••• . •• 86 
VI Cash Vs Margin Transactions New York Stock 
Exchange's Public Transaction Studies for 
Five Dates From 1952 Through 1956 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 89 
VII Cash Vs Margin Transactions New York Stock 
Exchange's Public Transactio_n Studies for 
Five Dates F.rom 1952 Tbr rugh 1956 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 90 
VIII Cash Vs Margin Trar~actions New York Stock 
Exchange's Public Transaction Studies for 
Five Dates From 1952'lhr ough 1956 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 91 
IX Cash Vs Marg i n Transact ions New York Stock 
Exchange' s Public Transaction Studies for 
Five Dates From 1952 Through 1956 •••••••..••••• 92 
X New York Stock Excl:Rr.ge :Monthly Reported 
Stock Volume and Margin Requirement Char.g es 
Since 1936..................................... 95 
XI Average Daily Stock Volume and Char.ges in 
Margin Requirements Since 1936 •••••••••••••••• 96 
XII Customers' Net Debit Balances and Changes 
in Margin Requirements Since 1936 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 98 
XIII Stock .Prices and Increases In Margin Re-
quirements Since Early 1945 •••••••••••••.•••••• 99 
XJV S & P 90 Stock Price Index and Margin 
Changes Since 1936 •••••••••.••••.•.•••••••••••• 100 
5 
6 
TABLE 
XV Reported Stock Volume Average, High and 
Low Record Days from 1945 to 1956.......... 136 
XVI Tum over af Listed Shares on the New York 
Stock Exchange 1929-1956................... 137 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Anyone 1 who has read either newspapers or current 
periodicals recently~ must be aware of the frequency with 
which edi toria 1 writ era and financial reporters have been 
devoting columns to monetary and fiscal policies of the 
government. An essential and integral part of monetary 
policy~ in ~rticular~ is devoted to the general category 
of credit control and to the selective category of stock 
purchases on credit. By policing c r edit problems involving 
securities effectively, the government hopes not only to 
curb excessive speculation in the stock narket 1 but ala o 
to prevent evils that might occur in the economy as a re-
sult of these excesses. 
A belief that movements of stock prices have bad 
repercussions up on business activities bas caused the stock 
mark et to be subjected to adverse criticism in recent years. 
Although this criticism has been directed to all phases of 
stock market activity, a disproportionate amount has been 
directed at margin trading. Inasmuch as many critics claim 
that margin traders' fi' ofi ts depend primarily upon appre-
ciation of market prices~ rather than upon income derived 
from dividends, such trading belongs to the realm of specu-
lation and is intimately connected with stock purchases on 
credit. Speculation can also occur with cash purchases of 
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stock, but the general public usually attributes blame for 
speculation to margin trading and credit. 
Reading reports of the government's attempts at 
control in this field revealed rmny interesting ramifi-
cations. Earlier, abortive efforts were finally culminated 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934. 
This Act gave tbe Federal Reserve System 1 s Board of Gover-
nors strong, regulatory paver to control margins in stock 
purchases on credit. 
PURPCBE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate past 
and current principles and practices involving purchases 
of stocks on credit and to resolve, if possible, specific 
questions surrounding these purcmses. 
A 4ominant factor believed to be hampering 
effective use of credit was utilization of rmrgin require-
ments in stock purchases. A.s part of the general study, · 
an attempt was made to dis cover just what effect, if any, 
that margin requirements have had upon the stock market and 
to trace the effectiveness of these requirements since 
their inauguration in 1934. 
During preparation of this study, margin require-
ments were reduced from 70 per cent to 50 per cent. Wall 
Street did not openly rejoice at this change, but seemed 
to take the reduction in stride. This was quite different 
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from turbulent scenes that marked other margin Chaoges, 
especially increases. 
BOUNDARIES 
Boundaries of this investigation were limited to 
actual credit purchases of stocks by individuals from 
brokers. Institutional investors were excluded from con-
sideration. In addition, those individuals who borrow from 
banks to purchase stocks on credit were not included because 
of differences in these transactions. 
Margin buying may be defined as purchasing se-
curities with funds borrowed from brokers. Technically, 
purchasing securities with funds borrowed from banks is not 
a margin purchase, but such transactions resemble margin 
purchases quite closely. Also, whatever is said, for or 
against one type of transaction, can usually be applied to 
the other. However, care must be exercised in doing this 
since significant differences do exist. Relationship be-
tween bank and borrower is generally, but not alwa ys, less 
impersonal than tha. t of broker to customer. Bank loans 
ordinarily require g radual liquidation or at least .. periodic 
interest pa ynen ts, whereas brokers merely add in.tepest to 
the principal each month and do not press customers for 
payment, as long as their collateral remains sufficient. 
Bank loans, in lieu of margin accounts, are generally riot 
very satisfactory unless the loan is to be liquidated from 
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income or other fUnds, usually he. ve definite liS. turity dates, 
and sale of s ecurl ties am a cq uis i tion of otre rs is less 
convenient. · Finally, banks usually demand evidence of 
capacity to repay by some other means th:l.n sale of collateral. 
Short sales were also excluded. One m1o sells 
short a ells s ecuri ties tba t re does not own in hope of buying 
the same issue later at a lower price and delive:ring this 
later purchase against the short sale. Margin cn.n be used 
to cover a portion of the transaction. Actually, this is an 
entirely different aspect of the stock market and was not 
within the realm of this study. 
Finally, over -the-counter exchanges we:re not con-
sidered for a very valid reason; there are no maJ:-gin require-
ments covering the purchase of securities in thif~ market. 
Therefore, only listed exchanges are involved. 
INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH 
This investigation was performed in a threefold 
manner. Primarily, library research disclosed what had been 
written about the topic in the past. Secondly, field re-
search, in the form of interviews with ~rious brokers, 
supplied ana wers to some current questions and al.s o helped 
to establish their viewpoint concerning margin regulations. 
An interview was conducted with staff members of 
several of Boston's J.s.rgest brokerage houses. Using these 
interviews as a basis, a questionnaire was assembled and 
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forwarded to many remaining brokerage houses in Boston and 
New York for their consideration and eval us.tion. Finally, 
results of these two methods of approach were analyzed to 
discover what conclusions could be drawn. 
PREVIOUS WORK IN THIS AREA 
Much had been written a bout selective controls -
for purchasing stocks on credit. Most written work dates 
to the early 1930s when the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Act was relatively new and the imprint of the 
stock market debacle of 1929 was still fresh in the minds 
of brokers, customers and writers. However, a stock market 
study had been eonduc ted as recently as 1955 by Congress 
and the Committee on Banking and Currency. This investi-
gation dealt with factors affecting the stock market but it 
did not delve too deeply into credit and margin requirements. 
There were numerous assenting and dissenting 
opinions concerning margins and credit purchases of stock. 
Yet, there was an actual dearth of statistical material 
available to substantiate many claims in the early years. 
In the late 1930s, statistics were finally ·made available 
which indicated, to some degree, the extent of stock 
market credit. Actual figures for trading volume by margin 
accounts were maintained for about four years from 1942 to 
1946, but were subsequently discontinued with the advent 
of the 100 per cent margin in 1946. They were never 
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revived when margins were lowered to 75 per cent in the 
following year. 
correspondence with the New York Stock Exchange, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston prcxiuced references to statistics that have 
been incorp crated into the text. In addition, the New York 
Stock Exchange bas conducted several periodic public tran-
saction studies to determine the p·ercentage of its business 
composed of credit buyers. Some of these results have also 
been utilized in the study • 
It seemed grossly unfair, during the study, to 
read many complaints about margins with out ape cific refer-
ences to substantiating statistics. Attempting to shift 
emphasis away from figure considerations did not add to the 
weight of various arguments. However, there are statistics 
available today and conclusions can be drawn from them, but 
these conclusions must be viewed with many qualifications. 
It is extremely difficult to establish cause and effect 
relationships here because innumerable factors are involved 
that can 1 t . be entirely separated from one another. 
In summar,r, an attempt has been made to resolve 
the following questions, specifically: 
1. How important are margin requirements? 
2. How muCh credit is actually involved 
in the stock market? 
3. Hem effective have mrgin requirements 
been in curbing inflation? 
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4. Are margin requirements gocxi for the 
economy as a whole? 
5. What statistics are a vails. ble concerning 
credit and the effects of margin changes? 
6. Wnat are some of the current practices 
involved in purchasing stocks on credit? 
13 
CH,APTER II 
HOW IMPORTANT ARE MARGIN REQUIREMENTS? 
CREDIT AND THE STOCK MARKET 
No one reasonably or seriously doubts that credit 
is vital to the economy today. It occupies a unique place 
in America 'a national life, as a measure of people's 
willingness to te.ke calculated risks on the future and as 
a measure of their confidence in the. t future. These :t'actors, 
risk taking and conf:idence, help in no SllRll measure to ex-
plain the extraordinary economy in .f(merica and the gJ;>owth 
that this economy has undergone. 
Furthermore, credit is vi t ally associated with 
the securities industry and to specific jobs that this in-
dustry must perfonn. Meeting investment needs of millions 
of people quickly, openly, and conveniently, and re.is ing 
new capital for business are industry's two basic jobs. 
Credit, which is actually the key to underwriters' ability 
to launch new stock issues, dealers' capacity to maintain 
inventory, e. n:i brokers' ability to finance their customers r 
cash as well as margin transactions, plays an intimate role 
in these jobs. In addition, specialists who carry supplies 
·of. stocks to pro vide orderly markets and odd-lot dealers 
who are involved in innumerable transactions during trading 
days, both utilize credit in their operations. Therefore, 
c r edit not only facilitates the flow of capital into the 
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securities industry, but also it enables well established 
companies and growing industries to attract basic equity 
capital needed for expansion, research, and development-* 
On the other hand, credit offers speculators the 
possibility ofmultiple profits from trading on their 
equity, if prices should .rise in the :rrarket. Rising · 
prices, in turn, provide them with expanding purchasing 
power, since they supply the margin needed for more credit 
purchases. Most :rra rgi n traders today try to trade on their 
equity by using their unrealized profits from advancing 
:ms.rk et prices of securities be ld to expand their holdings. 
The minority sell out when prices have risen and get into 
new investment opportunities. 
Because credit is so vital to tbe securities 
market, it seems logical that control over it should exist, 
to prevent abuses and to ];!'Ot ect parties involved. The SEC 
Act of 1934 gave the Bmrd; of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System author! ty to control areas of credit in the 
stock rmrket. One of these areas was utilization of margin 
requirements for purchase of stocks. In 1934, the Board 
was authorized to prevent excessive use of credit in the 
stock market. 
VJhen does c r edit become excessive? The Board 
must answer this question When it decides to change either 
15 
margin requirements or other credit cor.trols in the economy. 
The answer is based on personal judgment., the public's state 
of mind., and statistics. Margin changes do not always meet 
the approval either of the Stock Exchanges or its repre-
sentatives and many brokers feel that the Board acts too 
slowly in changing require:nents. 
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TABLE I 
Margin Requirement Chagges Since 1934* 
Effective Date Margin Required As % of Market Value 
For Credit 
by Brokers 
& Dealers 
on Listed 
Securities 
October 1, 1934 
February 1, 1935 
~pril 1, 1936 
November 1, 1937 
February 5, 1945 
July 5, 1945 
January 21, 1946 
February 1, 1947 
March 30, 1949 
January 17, 1951 
February 20, 1953(4) 
January 4, 1955(4) 
April 23, 1955 
January 15, 1958# 
25-45(1) 
25-55(1) 
55 
40 
50 
75 
100 
75 
50 
75 
50 
00 
70 
50 
For Short 
Sale 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
50 
50 
75 
100 
75 
50 
75 
50 
60 
70 
50 
For Loans 
by Banks 
on Stocks 
55(3) 
40 _ 
50 
75 
100 
75 
50 
75 
50 
60 
70 
50 
(1) Exact requirement on each security determined by re-
lation of its cur rent market price to its lowest price 
since July 1, 1933 
(2) Requirement p!:'ior to November 1, 1937 was margin "cus-
torr:arily required" by broker 
(3) Effective May 1, 1936 
i_4) Effective after the close of business 
Prescribed by the Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve 
System in accordance with the Securities Exchange Conunission 
Act of 1934. The regulations limit the amount of credit 
that may be extended on a security by prescribing a maximum 
loan value which is a specified per cent of its market value 
at the time of its extension; the margin requirement is the 
difference between the n:s_Iket value (100%) and the maximum 
loan value. Data shown here are for regular accounts. 
*Source-u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States:l956 (Seventy-seventh edition), Washington, 
D.c. 1956, P· 462. 
#The 1958 addition was made through the facilities of cur-
rent newspapers. 
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In order to evaluate changes in margin require-
ments, it is necessary to establish and definer What are 
margin requirements and upon what did margins formerly 
required deperrl.? With this frame of reference, it is 
easier to determine the relationship between margins and 
credit in the stock market. 
Margin requirements are regulations that limit 
the amount of credit that may be extended on a security by 
prescribing a max.imum loan value at the time of extension; 
the margin requirement is the difference between the 
market value am tre maximum loan value.* 
Generally speaking, margin refers to · a sum of 
money deposited with a broker to protect an account in 
securities against any unfavorable changes in prices of 
those securities. It has two purposes: It prevents cus-
tomers from overtrading or buying excessively in view of 
their trading funds, and it protects brokers against 
unsound security loans. 
The convenience of trading with margin is obvious. 
If one pla.ns to buy and sell several times within a few 
days, it is unnecessary to make payments for each purchase 
and to receive payment for each sale. A more sensible plan 
is to record transactions and to offset purchases against 
sales, settling far the balanced~~ 
*13, P• 9. · 
*~J-4, P• 156. 
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The amount of margin forrrv9rly required, before 
the Board stepped in to e sta.blish its rules, depended upon 
several :fu.ctors: If a. stock was high priced, a relatively 
sns.ll percentage change would mean either many points lost 
or gained. A 10 per cent decline in a stock selling at 
$250 would quickly wipe out a margin quite adequate to 
protect against the fluctuations of e. stock just as 
unstable, but aelling at perhaps $ 50 to $ 60. Stability 
was another important factcr. If a stock varied very little 
in price from day to day, a margin the. t off erect safety did 
not have tobe nearly as large as that needed on a stock of 
the same price but with wide fluctuations. Also, if the 
market had been advancing rapidly for some time, and was 
nearing e. point of uncertainty, large margins would be 
insisted upon. In addition, the custorr.er's credit standing 
a.rrl reputation for being on the right side of the market 
were other contributing factors. Today, the determination 
i s arbitrary. The Board sets the margin and brokers ad-
minister it. Brokers favor this method for the most part, 
since they don't want a. return to low margins. They fear 
the cutthroat competition for business and the dangers of 
rampant speculation that would result if n:e.rgins were per-
mitted to be as low as they formerly were before 1934. 
BASIC RUlES GOVERNING MARGINS 
At the present time, the basic rule governing the 
purchase of stocks on credit is the Federal Reserve's 50 per 
19 
cent margin requirement, applicable to securities listed on 
any na ti ona.l exchange. This requirement was changed on 
January 15, 1958 to its present amount. Most brokers are 
satisfied with the 50 per cent figure since they feel that 
it restricts entry somewhat, yet at the same time permits· 
trading activity. · The rule does not apply to unlisted 
stocks which must be p3.id for in full, nor to exempted se-
curities like u. s. bonds, u. s. instrumentalities, and 
state and municip1l bonis. To purchase these, a broker 
can lerrl a hig):l percentage of n:e. rke t value - up to 95 per 
cent for u. s. governments and between 80 and 85 per cent 
for state and locals. Also, basic margin rules do not 
apply to stocks selling at very low prices (usually $ 3 or 
less) - simply because brokers don 1 t carry margin accounts 
on these stocks. 
If the price of stocks bought on margin rises, 
there are no difficulties. Margin can be reduced and more 
shares purchased. If n:e.rgin falls, however, there are more 
rules to be encountered. The federal law is pri.rnarily con-
cerned with initial rmrgins. In practice, exchanges and 
broker-dealers have set up special rules calling for more 
cash or collate:r>al if margins decline. These rules are 
agreed upon wren margin accounts are opened and contre.cts 
are signed. In addition, brokers not only receive permission 
to pledge securities as collateral, but also to sell them 
if compelled to do so by a severe decline in market prices. 
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customers are always given adequate warning to bring their 
accounts up to the required levels. These rules will be 
discussed more fully in Chap ter VII which deals with the 
current practices in the market today. 
The New York Stock Exchange has two basic require-
ments concerning margin purchases: a custon:er must have at 
least a $1~000 equity in his margin account when it is 
opened and he must keep his account up to a 25 per cent 
minimum maintenance level. This means that a customer's 
equity in a margin account must not fall below 25 per cent 
of currt:Jn.t market value. Most of the other major exchanges 
have similar rules. Today~ in practice, many firms require 
more than the $1,000 opening equity and some firms even 
discourage margin accounts for amounts less than $25~000. 
AJ.so, firms are much more stringent with the minimum main-
tenance rule sire e their requirements are often as high as 
30 to 35 per cent of current market value. This gives them 
a certain amount of leeway and actually protects them and 
their customers to a greater degree than the lower 25 per 
cent figure. 
Under exchi.mge rules, if a person buys 25 shares 
of stock ·at $120 per share~ and fe.YS $1,500 in cash to his 
broker, his debit balance is $1,500 and his equity balance 
is also $1,5)0. Suppose that the stock later falls to $c;O. 
His total value is now $2,000 and he still owes the broker 
$1,500 While his equity bas dropped to $ 500 ($2,000 less 
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$ 1,500) or 25 per cent of the market value of the securities. 
At this point, he just meets the requirements, a.s determined 
by the New York Stock Exchange. If the stock falls further, 
the broker must call on the person for extra cash or se-
curities to restore the margin to the 25 per cent level. 
Brokers must observe these minimum requirements, 
but they are free to impose their own restrictions, depending 
upon their appraisal of the customer, steeles that he owns, 
and current market conditions. This practice also applies 
to initial ne.rgins, since brokers can also demand higher 
margins, when accounts are opened. In :rpractice, they 
generally don't. Instead of h i@:l.er mar gins , they would 
refuse to ao business With a.n individual, since a demand 
tor hi@:l.er margins than those required by law would indi-
cate that they looked unfavorably upon the customer, his 
stocks, or tre market. Brokers don't make a. practice of 
charging higher initial mar gins, but they do charge higher 
minimum maintenance requirements quite consistently. 
ADVANTAGES OF MAINTAINING MORE THAN REQUIRED MARGIN 
The desirability of maintaining more than the 
minimum required margin can be illustrated by a situation 
that developed in May, 1940. Judged by the immediate past, 
prices were not exceptionally high on that date. Neither 
was the market weak technically, since subsequent study of 
selling orders that swamped the market revealed sellers to 
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be investors disposing of small blocks of securities owned 
outright. On May 11, 1940, the following stocks sold at 
these prices: Curtis-Wright at 11 1/4, General Electric 
at 35 3/8:~ General Motcrs at 53 3/8, Bethlehem Steel at 89 1/4, 
and United S-r;ates S-i,eel at 62 1/2. On Tuesday and Wednesday, 
May 12 and 13, Curtis -V'lrig ht declined 33 per cent, GE 12 per 
cent, GM 24 per cent, Beth S~eel 15 per cent and US Steel 
19 per cent. For example, if one had purchased 100 shares of 
US Steel at 62 1/2 on Moniay, May 11, 194U on a 40 per cent 
initis.l margin, as required by the Federal Reserve, he would 
ba ve found it necessary to respond to a margin call for $416 
on Wednesday and a second call for an additional $534 on the 
foliowing Tuesday. If he bad purchased Beth Steel, instead of 
US S-r;eel on Monday, his margin call two days later would have 
been $235 and a week later he would bave had to deposit an 
additional $745. Inaoility to meet either of these calls 
- -
would have resulted in the account being sold out at con-
siderable loss. This reflects what can happen in a relatively 
short time and illustrates the necessity for keeping an. ac-
count well margined at a 11 times. 
CREDIT AND MARGIN REQUIREMENTS. 
How is credit related to margin requirements? If 
a person intends to buy stocks on credit, he is gove~ned by 
margin rules. High margins permit fewer shares to be bought 
on credit than could qe bought with lower margins. A 50 per 
23 
cent margin permits a. person with $2., 500 to buy $5,000 worth 
of stock, While a. 70 per cent margin ne cessita.tes using 
$3,500 i n cash. Credit enhances the profitability of a. 
given i nvestnent if a right decision is made. For examp l e" 
if a. person bas $2,EOO, he can buy outrigli; 50 shares or 
stock ~elling a.t $ 50 per share. If the stock goes up $ 5 per 
share, he makes $250. If be buys on margin, his $2,500 will 
buy 100 shares ur:der the p resent 50 per cent margin rule. 
If the stock goes up $ 5, he makes $800 less broker's com-
mission am interest charges.* 
High margins restrict entry to the market, since 
they make .'it more expensive for a. customer to speculate. 
Low margins f&.cili tate Ell try, since less money has to be 
usect to buy shares. However, high margins, even a.s high 
a.s 100 per cent, cannot make people stop buying stocks, but 
they can make it more difficult for them to do so. Low 
margins do not make stocks more attractive, but they do 
permit a wider range of people to get into the market and 
they generally allow more activity. 
NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS INVOLVED I N THE MARKET 
Credit permits and facilitates entrance into the 
stock rrs.rket, but does it increase the number of persons 
in the market? How many margin accounts are there? 
·:t-21 
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The answer to these questions reveals that there 
have been no continuous or exact statistics for the number 
of margin accounts until recent years. In 1929~ there was 
more margin trading on the exchanges than in any other yee.r 
in the history of the ne. tion. In that year~ there were 
1~550~000 customers doing business with brokers on all ex-
changes in tre country. The New York Stock Exchange 
accounted for 1~372,000 or marly 90 per cent of this total. 
Approximately 600,000 or 40 per cent of the customers were 
margin traders and the rest were cash traders. On the New 
York Exchange~ 41 per cent of the accounts were :rmrgin 
accounts~ against 22 per cent for all the other exche.rges. 
By 1933, the total number of customers on all exchanges 
had fallen to 1~028,000 with the ratio between margin and 
cash ru stomers remaining about the same.-11-
In 1936, there were 418 reporting member firms 
of the New Yoik Exchange which carried margin accounts. 
The number of margin acccunts handled by that Exchange 
totaled 205~884.-i!-* For selected dates since 1939~ the 
number of margin accounts handled by the New York Exchange 
has been the follcming: On December 31~ 1939, there were 
256,504 margin accounts. On December 31~ 19:1:6~ there were 
only 56,131 margin accounts. This small figure was primarily 
*7, P• 244. 
**5, P• 94. 
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attributable to the 100 per cent margin requirement invoked 
earlier in the year. On December 31, 1949, there were 
122,785 margin accounts. 
Margin trading is now substantially les-s than it 
was many years ago. In tbe New York Times of April 8, 1956, 
it was reported that there were 287,000 margin accounts. Of 
these, 140,000 were margin accounts by courtesy, which means 
tb.a t they were either seldom. used or that they seldom used 
credit. Of the remaining 147 ,000 accounts 1 only between 
65~000 and 70 ,000 were considered to be e.cti ve. * 
In October, 1957, it was reported by the presi-
. . 
dent of the New York Stock Exchange the. t there were a bout 
300,000 margin acccunts held by member finns of the New 
York Exchange. While 300,000 margin accounts may appear 
to be a reasonably large number, it is certainly a much 
smaller figure than the 000,000 accounts that were active 
in 1929. This decline in the number of accounts must be 
attributable, in part, to the strengthening of nargin re-
quirements for the purchase of securities on credit. 
From the interviews and questionnaires 1 it was 
established that margin trading today is a significantly 
small part of the total brokerage business. Only a few 
firms said that margin trading occupied as much as 25 per 
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cent of their business, while the majority of firms only 
have between 5 and 10 per cent of their business with margin 
accounts. 
BELmFS OF MARGIN TRADERS 
It is obvious that it is easier to trade on margin, 
but what are some of the other considerations tl':s.t motivate 
margin traders? A.re margins important to margin traders? 
Their numbers have declined but people still continue to 
trade on margin. 
Margin traders feel that under existing conditions of 
property, owners of securities should ba ve the privilege of 
borrowing thereon, as rrru.ch as brokers wi 11 lend, that their 
operations mke for continuous and liquid markets service-
able to investors, and tba. t they enable the market to absorb 
larger volumes of new issues,thereby increasing capital's 
flow into industry. However, mrgin buyers have no indis-
putable right to borrow ani brokers have no indisputable 
right to leni other people's money. Borrowing should not be 
denied arbitrarily, but there should be restraints imposed 
upon borrowers for social welfare. Many of .the early abuses 
in the stock market had to be corrected not only for the 
market's best interests, but also for the best interests of 
the economy as a whole. Brokers recognize the need for 
restraint. 
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Without denying that liquidity is a desirable in-
vestment characteristic~ it is primarily serviceable to 
speculators in this instance. The very ease with Which 
buyers and sellers of securities could fcrmerly get in and 
out of tre :n:B.rket increased the natural propensity to gamble 
in the late 1920s. This propensity was reflected in the 
complexities of stock price fluctuations. It often pro-
duced unstable ns.rket conditions~ which were more dangerous 
to the economy than discontinuous ones. 
Funds supplied to imustry by :rmrgin traders have 
different and more complex effects upon industry than they 
generally assume. Not all funds are allocated for plants~ 
equipment~ and working capital. Firms bave used some money 
to reduce their interest charges and to remove themselves 
from bank control. ·· In addition, many funds entering the se-
curities markets have served to inflate prices of market 
lea-ders and to overstimulate luxury goods industries with 
resultant d1 re economic effects. 
CRITICISM OF MARGIN TRADING. 
Margin buying was severely criticized during the 
late 1920s and early 1930s because large numbers of margin 
buyers were associated with results that occurred during the 
stock ns.rket break and subsequent severe and prolonged 
decline. This criticismwas justified. Brokers feel today 
that low rna rgins helped to increase the spiraling ef'f'eots 
of that period. 
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Margin buying, spurred on by rmrgins as low as 
10 or 20 per cent, helped in no small measure to create 
the stock market boom which eventually collapsed with heavy 
losses and failed to cl:e.nnel credit into industry, since 
margin traders were chiefly concerned with rmrket leaders 
whose stocks were already outstanding. Also, it adversely 
affected the national opinion of the stock market, and was 
often carried on by uninformed speculators with ina.dequa te 
margin. Today, the margin trader is usually an experienced 
investor who has graduated from trading with cash. He is 
generally a sophisticated individual who is well informed 
and his margin at no time is inadequate. 
COMPARISON WITH CREDIT PURCHASES AND SHORT SALES 
Margin buying has long been associated with credit 
transactions and at the same time uninfonn.ed people have 
criticized margins because of their association with short 
sales. The mture o:r installment purch.a.ses resembles the 
same basic operation as buying on credit in other lines of 
business. A nan buying stock on margin resembles an indi-
vidua 1 who purcllases a $ 15,000 home with a $3,000 down pay-
•· 
ment. This .argument has been attacked on the grounds that 
most margin buyers have no intention of buying the stock on 
the imtallment plan, but merely inte:rrl to resell it at a 
higher price. Vfuile some stock is undoubtedly paid for in 
full, the rnajorit y is liquidated without further payment. 
29 
The average margin trader today ms no intention of actually 
keeping the stock until it is fully raid for. 
A second defense of margin trading is the com-
mercial purchase agreement. This defense states that 
margin purclla. ses are similar to buying s took for future de-
livery by mer chants or manufacturers. This defense has been 
challenged and rightly so, sime manufacturers or merchants 
who buy inventory will process, store, and distribute t~ 
material end thus they render so-called utility services to 
it. Stock s necula tors merely sell the identical stock that 
they purchased without adding any utility to it. They reap 
the profits if it bas appreciated in :rmrket price, while 
held in their possession. 
Others feel that buying a car on the installment 
plan is equivalent, in many cases, to money saved which 
might have been used in various ways. There is little dif-
ference between savirg $10 per week to purchase furniture 
and buying it on $10 we~kly installments. Purchasing se-
curities with borrowed money is a different story. Money 
placed in securities represents savings. If securities are 
bought on credit, this is an outright oversaving which may 
jeopardize true savings, since price declines force liqui-
dation. The average margin trader today is a wealthy 
person. Declines in marKet prices don't affect him too ad-
versely, or at le~st not as they did in 1929, when many 
sns.ll, overextended mar gin traders were unable to meet margin 
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calls and were wiped out by forced stock sales. In October, 
1957, when tbe stock market suffered a noticeable decline, 
ther·e were very few forced sales and very few custom9rs had 
to sell securities to meet margin calls because they were 
generally well rmrgined in their accounts. 
Brief mention will be made of the relationship be-
tween mar gin buying and short sales. Mar gin buying involves 
purchasir.g stocks on credit, while short selling involves of-
fering for sale s ecuri ties which the seller does not own. 
Others define it as selling borrowed property. Speculative 
short selling involves selling shares that one does not own, 
making delivery with borrowed S"'GOck, purchasing stock later 
at lower prices, and retuming purchased shares to tre lender. 
It is "Chis type of short selling that has received the most 
criticism. Because margins may be used to cover a portion of 
the sale, there are margin requirements governing the short 
sale of sec uri ties • 
Without margin requirements or credit control in the 
stock market, it is obvious that abuses could occur. Low mar-
gins, determined by brokers, led to rapid entry and to active 
competition between brokers for business. Uniform require-
.. 
menta are beneficial and important, since they tend to reduce 
competition fCir' business by placing control in the hands of 
impartial rule makers, make the rules easier to administer 
and easier to ~omprehend, restrict entry when the Board de-
cides tba t credit res become too excessive, and also permit 
brokers to mve a valid reason for refusing business of un-
desirable customers. 
31 
CHAPTER III 
HOW MUCH CREDIT IS ACTUALLY DJVOL VED 
IN THE STOCK MARKET? . 
CUSTOMERS' DEBIT BAIANCES AND MONEY EORROWED 
A debit balance is created when a margin account 
is opened· It rep;> esents money owed to the broker for the 
unpaid portion of the stock p urcrase. The money that 
brokers use to cover these debit balances is generally 
borrowed from banks. Brokers borrow principally to relend 
to thtJir customers~ but loans are also used for other pur-
poses and part of the funds extended to customers is from 
sources other than banks. 
In general~ movements in borrowing of brokers have 
corresponded with movements in customers' debit balances~ 
but tb.ey e:re not identical at any time in amount, and their 
correlation is only approximate. Changes in brokers' bor-
rowing reflect shifts in total customers' credit balances, 
changes in cash currently held by brokers on deposit in 
banks, am cmngei:l in the financial requirements of firms 
for purcha. sing or carrying securities f<r their own ac-
counts or for accounts of their customers. 
Demand for credit by customers can be met by 
brokers from one of three sourceo: capital supplied by the 
firm's partners~ customers' funds generally awaiting rein-
vestment~ and funds secured by brokers' loans. Brokers 
-
constantly receive fur.ds from customers who intend sooner 
or later to me them in the market and from stock clearing 
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corporations for settlement of balances when the firm is 
selling more securities tha.n it is buying. On the other 
hand, firms lose funds to customers who ma.y be withdrawing 
them for use outside the security market. If cash flows 
are balanced, the firm will not mve to borrow. If custo-
mers begin to buy more than they sell, or to withdraw more 
than they deposit with their brokers, recourse must then be 
had to brokers' loans. Advances by brokers to customers 
through debit balances do not automatically result in 
brokers making loans. Whether or not a loan were made 
would deperxl upon the firm's c'lll:'rent financial condition. 
Brokers' loans tend to expand With: Increases in 
margin buyers, incr•eases in shares bought on margin, and 
shifts into trading done in higher priced stocks, coupled 
with a rising stock market. Brokers' loans are also sen-
sitive to margin requirements. If the loan value of 
specul.s.tive securities is zero, so that margin requirements 
are 100 per cent, as was the case in 1946, brokers need not 
borrow to finance security purchases. With lower margin 
requirements, brokers' demand for bank credit is bound to 
rise for any given state of speoul.s.tive antici!1ltion on the 
stock exchanged~ 
TREND OF CREDIT IN THE MARKET 
Tables II, III and IV reveal figures for credit 
involved in the stock market currently and in previous years. 
~~7, P• 263. 
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Ta. ble II shows cha. nges t m t h.e.. ve taken place in debit 
balances in selected years from 1935 until 1956. Debit 
ba.la.ro es ha. ve been i ncrea.sing each year and a. t the end of 
1956 they totaled 2.9 billion dollars, which was a. small 
1.3 per cent of total market value of listed securities. 
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T,ABLE II 
Customers I Net Debit Bale. nces, Free Credit Balances And 
The Market Value of New York Stock Exchange 
Lis ted Stocks Selected Years·~ 
End of Net Debit Free Credit Market Net Debit 
Year Ba.lanc e Balance # Value of Balance as 
Listed As % of 
Stocks Value of 
Listed 
Stocks 
-- In Millions of Dollars --
1935 1258 286 46, 946 2.7% 
1940 677 281 41, 891 1.6 
1945 1138 652 73, 767 1-5 
1950 1358 890 93, 807 1.4 
1951 1293 822 109, 484 1.2 
1952 1366 727 120, 536 1.1 
1953 1696 713 117, 257 1.4 
1954 2429 1019 169, 149 1.4 
1955 2825 894 207, 699 1.4 
1956 2856 881 219, 176 1.3 
*Source -New York Stock Fact Book for 1957, p. 32. 
#These include ba1a);1.ces in acccilnts carrying both listed 
.and unlisted stoeks and bends as well as commodities and 
other items. To a minimum degree, they include balances 
of non-member brokers who are not members of any national 
securities exchange. 
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TABLE III 
Total Net Borrowing on Colla tera1 
of Members of the New York 
Stock Exchange for 
Selected De.t es* 
Date Member Borrow ing-Mil1ions 
of Dollars 
Ratio of !Dans 
to Market Values 
of All Stocks 
Jan. 1, 1919 
Je.n. 1, 1920 
Je.n. 1, 1921 
Jan. 1, 1922 
Dec. 1, 1922 
Je.n. 1, 1925 
Je.n. 1, 1926 
Jan. 1, 1927 
Je.n. 1, 1928 
Je. n. 1, 1929 
Oct. 1, 1929 
Nov. 1, 1929 
Dec. 1, 1929 
Jan. 1, 1930 
Je.n. 1, 1931 
Jan. 1, 1932 
Aug. 1, 1932 
Me.y 1, 1937 
Apr. 1, 1948 
Jan. 1, 1950 
1,002 
1,613 
1,079 
1,192 
1,805 
1,932 
3,513 
3,293 
4,433 
6,440 
8,549 
4,017 
3,990 
1,894 
587 
242 
1,187 
272 
674 
9.98 
8.58 
8.91 
9. 54 
9.82 
8.51 
6.32 
6.17 
3.86 
2.20 
1.18 
2.05 
0.30 
0.71 
-l(-Source-Leff1er, George L·: The Stock Market, New York, 
Ronald Press, 1951, p. 269 • . 
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End of the year debit balances have increased and there has 
also been a substantial increase in the market value of 
listed securities from 46 billion in 1935 to 219 billion 
dollars in 1956. The percentage of debit balances~ while 
ire reasing, has been compared with another increasing per-
centage which has grown at a faster pace. Actually, the 
relative percentage comparison of debit balances to market 
value of listed securities has remained about 1 1/2 per 
cent for the past twenty years. 
Table III shows total net borrowing for members 
of the New York Stook Exchange for selected dates from. 19~9 
to 1950. The largest figure reflected in this table was 
reached on OctOber 1, 1929 when member borrowing totaled 
approxirrA tely 8. 5 billion dollars. This figure appeared to 
reflect mainly customers' debit balances on that date. Of 
this amount, about 6.5 billion dollars represented loans to 
brokers by non-bank lenders. In addition, there was an un-
known amount of credit a va1la ble to brokers from free 
credit balances. The 8.5 billion dollars represented about 
10 per cent of the market value of all stocks listed on the 
Exchange in 1929. This is in sharp contrast to figures for 
January 1, 1950 wren member borrowing totaled only 674 
million and was .7 per cent of the total market value of 
listed securities. 
It is obvious that credit in the stock market bas de-
clined. However, it is questionable as to how much of this 
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decline is directly attributable to more stringent margin 
requirements. Once uniform margins were i mposed, there 
was and bas been a noticeable decline in borrowing and in 
the relationship between debit balances, brokers' loans, 
and the market value of listed stocks. Credit today is 
but a small part of the stock market compared to the vast 
amount of value behind the ever-increasing number of stocks 
that a r e listed on the exchange. Most of the trading in 
bro kerage houses is conducted on a cash basis. 
BEST BRAKE ON STOCK JMRKET CREDIT 
Are margin requirements the best brake on stock 
market credit? What · is the a ctua.l effect of margin control 
on the ern ount of credit in the market? 
Since early 1945, the Federal Reserve has ordered 
higher margins to reduce public borrowing in six separate 
occasions. Stock rmrket credit does not operate in a 
vacuum. The New York Stock Exchange analyzed the effects 
of margin increases upon the amount of credit, course of 
stock prices, and stock market volume. These studies were 
made for a period of six months . before and six months after 
the respective changes. 
This research, haN ever, was subject to two very 
important qualifies. ti ons: The difficulty of determining 
what might have happened had these margin requirements not 
been changed and what might b.a ve been the results had they 
been complete"ly isola ted from general credit controls, 
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T!BLE IV 
Borrowing oy Members o~ the New York Stock Exchange 
For Selected Years 1935-1956 Inc·* 
End of Year Total On Govemment On Other 
Borr0wing Securities Securities 
1935 938 N.A. N·A· 
1940 413 N·A· · N·A· 
1945 1,074 494 580 
1950 909 211 698 
1951 850 . 96 754 
1952 1,207 205 1,002 
1953 1,461 233 1.-228 
1954 1,919 171 1,748 
1955 2,569 94 2,475 
1956 2,474 151 2,323 
-l!-Source-New Ycrk Stock ~xchs. r:ge Fact Book for 1957, P• 32. 
business trends, and the public's state of mind. Quanti-
tative effects of these add it iona.l cms idera ti ons were dif-
ficult to ascertain and to weigh in view of their very 
close int era.ct ion and effect not only upon the stock market 
but also upon the economy e.s e. whole. 
The Excrenge discovered that when credit controls 
were tight, as from 1955 through 1957, customer borrowing 
leveled out noticeably. Thus, it was felt that the Reserve's 
tight money policy and not selective credit control through 
the uti liza.tion of margins :tad restrained stock market 
credit effectively.* However, these were isolated instances 
and no definite trend or correlation can be established over 
a. pericx:l of time for this theory. 
Without uniform and strict margins, there would 
be no guarantee that money couldn't find its VJ"ay into the 
market, regardless of credit restrictions on borrowing. 
Tight money could still be used even if there were no 
margin rules to prevent entry of individuals into the market 
because many people would be willing to pay higher prices 
fer borrowed money if they could make even higher rates of 
return on their stock purchases. Regardless of the difficulty 
involved in obtaining funds to invest, restriction, in the 
form of margin, still remains e.t the source of entry. Ability 
to t e.ke e.dva.nt age of interest rates must wait until one can 
secure entrance to the market. 
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Margin purcl::B sers contemplate an increase in tl::e 
price of the is sues that they buy and take advantage of the 
differential in interest rates che. rged by banks or brokers 
and tre yield on the issue. A security purchased on money 
borrowed at 6 per cent, when it is yielding 7 per cent or 
more, results in a profit to purchasers Who are willing to 
borrow at tba.t rate. Brokers today rarely cbB.rge much over 
1 per cent above tbe call rate to their customers. The per-
centage ebB. rged to them de~nds upon the size and activity 
of the rmrgin account. Less. active accounts :are usually 
charged a penalty rate, while the more active accounts are 
charged in relationship to the amount of business and 
trading tm t they do. 
Mention will be made in Chapter V of current 
statistics available on the subject of credit and margins 
and they wi 11 show not only what has happened to volume, 
prices, and debit balances when margins were lncreased, but 
also what happened to these factors when marg:tns were 
lowered. 
GENERAL AVAilABILITY OF CREDIT AND TEE STOCK MARKET 
Are stock prices only affected by the amount of 
credit involved in the stock market? No, theJ::-e are many 
other considerations. The general availability and cost · 
of credit for other items has some effect upon prices. 
The total amount of credit outside the market influences 
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funds available for b.lying stock. This can have inflationary., 
stabilizing or deflationary effects upon the market. 
During periods of comparatively full employment, 
excessive credit cannot be put to work utilizing large 
numbers of unemployed workers and idle plant capacity., thus 
increasing total production. Instead, excessive credit 
merely bids up prices on existing supplies of goods and ser-
vices. When credit is scarce., during periods of relatively 
high unemployment and idle plant capacity, it is difficult 
to achieve increase~ in production and consumption which 
would put these reso'l.li'ces to work. Reaction ·t;o these 
factors existing in tbe economy may be r-eflect ed in people's 
attitudes toward stockB. With many funds ava:Llable, prices 
of stocks can be bid up to inflated highs and with few funds 
available., the reverse is true. 
EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN CRED:ri' 
Wba. t are the effects of an increase in the amount 
of stock market credit? By tending to raise prices of 
stocks, an increase in stock market credit tends to encourage 
flotation of stocks and use of funds that can be obtained by 
such flotations. 
Rising stock prices result in capiteLl gains either 
in realized or in unrealized form and expectations of further 
rises and gains; these tend to encourage stocl!: market parti-
cipants to speni more for consumer goods and s:ervices, es:-
pecially luxuries. In other words, rising prices encourage 
expen:l itures for comsumption. 
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The buying public activates existing money supplies 
and increases moneta:cy velocitY' by increasing ~expenditures 
for investment. From the overall point of view, the initial 
impact of an . increase in stock market credit increases the 
national product by expanding investment and the money supply. 
If manpower, facilities and materials are available, increases 
can find outlets in the form of greater physical volume of 
production. If they are not available, increases in dollar 
figures for investment, money supply, and the national pro-
duct tend to represent increases in prices, rather than in 
physical production. This 1 eads to inflation. Restraint 
placed upon credit buying through the imposition of margin 
requirements tends to impede the rise of inflation and 
speculation, although they cannot eliminate these evils 
entirely. 
DEGREE OF REST~INT 
It is obvious that such a pyramiding effect needs 
restraint. How much restraint should be used and upon What 
does the degree of restraint used depend? 
The degree of restraint used depends upon the 
Reserve's evaluation of excess credit in the stock narket. 
The degree of restraint needed in stock market credit depends 
upon a number of factors ·: The extent of inflationary prossure 
that must be comated, aid that could be obtained from other 
government instruments such as fiscal policy, 'other selected 
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credit instruments, and general credit controls. 
There are times when relaxation in credit policy 
would be in order even though res~.oraint were appropriate 
for one or another instrument of control. Con.versely, re-
straint might at times be desirable in one ar·ea alone 
although relaxation were needed elsewhere. In short, each 
instrument of c·redit policy has its own characteristics 
and each should be used to ble oo the inatrum~nts into a 
harmonious whole fer maximum contribution to stable economic 
progress for the whole economy. This is what the Reserve 
does wnen its act~ ons upon the stock ns.rket are misunderstood 
by many people. It attempts to survey the whole picture and 
to act in behalf of the best interests of everyone in the 
economy. Many short-sighted people are unaware of the long 
range implications that each action of the Re1serve has. It 
has generally moved cautiously when imposing selective credit 
restrictions.* 
SELECTIVE AND EFFECTIVE CREDIT REGUIATION 
What is selective credit regulation and when is 
such regulation effective? Selective credit regulation 
differs from general credit regulations such as open market 
operations, since it applies not to total credit volume, 
irrespective of its use., b:lt only to credit made available 
in a p3.rticular segment of the economy such as the stock 
narket. 
*42, PP• 214-233. 
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To be effective, selective credit regulation must 
relate to a.n a.rea. which is reasonably definable in terms of 
such things as purpcse of tl:'..e credit, collateral for it, and 
nature of the credit contract. Trade practices must he 
specialized and sufficiently s ta.ndardized so that regu-
lations can be applied in terms of either a continuation or 
extension of those procedures, rather than as a drastic 
description of them. 
Furthermore, the credit a.rea subject to such regu-
lation must be important enough in terms of size and vola-
·tility so that its regulation can help to reinforce general 
credit maasures within the economy. Flow of credit should 
be responsive to pa.rticular adjustments in borrowers' equity 
or loan maturity. Selective credit regulation must not 
unduly impede permitted credit transactions and there should 
be minimum possibility for successful evasion in case of 
other transactions. · Fine.lly, above all other considerations, 
constructive results of such regulation should be great 
enough to outweigh burdens associated with it, both on those 
subject to.1t and on those administering it. 
Today, selective credit regulations apply in fields 
where credit practices and procedures are comparatively 
standardized. This facilitates activities of regulations 
and coincides with jobs tba.t effective credit regulation is 
assigned to do. 
Stock market credit is a related factor affecting 
stock market activity and price fluctuations. Changes in 
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its volume are both an effect and a cause of current credit 
and monetary developments. It must always be recognized, 
however, that stock market credit is only one aspect of 
stock rmrket movement and one aspect of general credit with-
in the country. Credit in the market is relatively small 
in comp3.rison with consumer credit, but the publicity at-
tached to tre market and its psychological importance 
cannot be disregarded as contributing factors. A special 
characteristic of stock mar.ket credit regulation is its 
effectiveness in restricting credit usage in that area even 
when objectives of overall credit policy require that supply 
and cost of credit remain easy for the economy generally.-!~ 
There is not as much credit in the stock market 
today as there formerly was, but the spot light is always on 
this economic arena.. Changes in the market have wide reper-
cussions elsewhere, sime the Reserve's decisions there are 
generally treated e.s being indicative of current credit 
policies concerning the nation as a whole. These decisions 
are oftentimes forerunners of additional actions. 
The Reserve me. y or may not think that overall 
credit ccndi tiona are adequate when changes are made in 
. . 
the market, but these cmnges are still based qn the 
Reserve's appraisal of available atat.iatics a·nd contributing 
factors, as to whether or not credit is excessive. The 
stock market survived a 100 per cent cash purchase situation 
*42, pp. 2l4-233. 
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that occurred in 1946 without too much difficulty, but it 
took years to recover from the fiasco that happened in 1929. 
Low margins were largely responsible for that debacle. 
Stricter margin requirements !:e.ve averted attention from the 
use of credit to buy stocks. Today, margin sales rarely ac-
count for as much as 30 per cent of total exchange business. 
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CliAPrER IV 
HOW EFFECTIVE F.A VE MARGIN REQUIREMEN'.l~S 
BEEN IN CURBING INFIATION 
PREVIOUS ATTEMPrS AT SElECTIVE CONTROL 
Selective e ontrols are distinguished from general 
controls because their primary and principal :1.mpac t is not 
on total credit used in the economy as a whole, but on 
credit used in particular s actors of the economy. The SEC 
Act of 1934 was not the first attempt at selective control_, 
but it has survived- longer than many previous efforts to 
curb speculation and credit. 
Legislative concern for stock market credit was 
shown as early as 1913 by provisions of the origina.l Federal 
Reserve Act which declared ineligible for discount_, notes 
drawn for the purp ose of trading in stocks. G:r>owth of 
stock ns.rket credit was subjected to official warnings by 
the Reserve at various intervals between 1915 and 1919. It 
was inquire d into by a joint congressional commission in 
1921. Later_, more extensive credit growth prompted the 
Reserve 1 s a ction early in 1926 when it publishe1d current 
figures for brokers 1 loans and inspired _,early i.n 1929, both 
the Reserve's empnatic warning against expansion of stock 
market creo.it and the direct action against it. 
Margin requirement techniques evolved from a 
prolonged process of trial and error. Among meth,ods 
previously tried were: Moral suasion_, induced agreement, 
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publication of statistical facts, direct action, and <Emarxl 
for rediscount eligibility for stock market peLper. 
Moral suasion, in the form of warnings issued by 
the Reserve in 1919 and again in 1929, seemed to have some 
effect in dampening speculative fervor, but only to a slight 
degree and only for a brief period of time. Since there was 
no penalty attached to this form of reproach, its limita-
tions were obvious. 
Induced agreement was the result of an arrangement 
worked out during world War r, under pr assure of war finan-
cing, bet-ween the New York Stock Exchange and a group of 
New York banks. From 1917 to 1918, the purpo::1e of this 
agreement was to insure that these banks would make enough 
street loans on acceptable collateral to servEt the Exchange's 
needs a rrl to prevent stock money ra tea from going so high as 
to interfere with the marketing of government securities for 
war financing. In September, 1918, there was an increase in 
demam for thea e loans. On November 4, 1918, the Exchange 
agreed to prevent an increase in the aggregate: amount of bor-
rowing by its member finns above the level at which they 
currently s-cood. This level was about 1 milli.on dollars. 
The arrangement, ooupled with a. tigbxening of 
margin requirements imposed by New York Banks, continued 
for only two months. During its brief existence it stabi-
lized the volume of street loans, but it is questionable 
as to whether or not it bad much effect upon stock market 
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specuJation and prices. However, both trading volume and 
price levels remained quite stable. In January, 1~19, this 
agreement was terminated and was immediately followed by a 
sharp increase in trading volume, price levels, and brokers' 
borrowing. During the next nine months, brokers 1 borrowing 
incre~::<. sed by over 700 million della rs. 
In February, 1926, the Reserve began publicizing 
wee.~rly statistical facts dealing with brokers' loans. These 
amounted to 3.1 billion dol1a.rs in that month. Prior to 
publication, these figures had not been made available to the 
general public. The figures were actually larger than many 
people believed them to be. It was felt the publication of 
these figures had a temporary restraining effect upon the 
market since credit volume, trading volume and price levels 
for stocks fell for a number of months after t.his release. 
Losses were later restored during the year and these indi-
cators did not seem to be affected per·manently by subsequent 
publications. 
In an attempt to control credit, the Reserve used 
direct action in 1929. By this device, central banks de-
manded that the individual debtors of member "banks either 
had to restore their positions by liquidating individual 
balances or else reduce their street loans. This action was 
supposed to prevent abuse of Reserve bank credit. Brokers' 
loans declined by about 300 million dollars and trading 
volume dropped by a slight amount • At the same time, short 
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term money rates on both street and commercia l loans rose. 
Reduction in banks r street loans, however, wa~1 more than 
offset by an increase of 50 per cent in street loans of 
various other lenders. As usually happens with all re-
strictions of this type, loopholes were sought and obtained 
to thwart the law. Denial of eligibi.lity for discount pur-
poses to steele market loans was born with the Federal Reserve 
in 1913. Its purposes were to insure that sel f-liquidating 
paper would be excluded from earning assets of the central 
banking system aid to exert influence on credtt used for 
financing trans actions ·in the stock market. Originally the 
plan was to p:>ohibit member banks from obtainlng Reserve 
bank credit by discounting stock ma.rket loans~· t bus cur-
tailing their power to make such loans and all owing stock 
rmrket credit to be controlled . Member banks ma.de loans 
for stock market credit by discounting other loans. In ad-
dition, loans were also available to the stock market from 
other scurces. Funds obtaine d through other operations of 
the system were used as bases for credit by both member and 
non-member banks. 
Prior to 1933, the Reserve was handicapped not 
only by the weaknesses inherent in the existing tools, but 
also b y non-existence of specific legislative authority for 
control over credit. The banking act of 1933 gave the 
Reserve authority to consider whether or not undue use of 
bank credit was being rm. de for speculative cai•rying or 
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trading in securities. Fer making undue use of bank credit 
for this purpose, individual member banks could be suspended 
by the Reserve from use of credit facilities of the system.-:~ 
The SEC Act of 1934 subjected borrowers to re-
straint ,limiting the amount tbt:tt they could borrow. This 
amount was related to the type and value of collateral that 
they t.a d to provide. Previous methods only affected the 
supply side of t l::e market. 
BACKGROUND TO TfJ:E ERA - PRE 1929 
'Vlfuat were the conditions that finally resulted 
in the SEC Act o1· 1934? After many · years without definite 
authority, what happened to induce legislation? 
For mare than a century, wide upswings and down-
swings in stock prices, accompanied by large fluctuations 
in stock market credit volume, have almost imrariably ac-
centuated inflationary booms and subsequent d•epressions. 
The bull market of the late 1920s and its aftermath were 
glaring examples. The government has always been concerned 
with excessive us.e of credit, excessive SfS culation, and 
excessive utilization of margins in stock pur~~hases, but it 
waited until 1934 to draft adequate legislation to control 
these areas. 
As early as 1909, the report of the Hughes Com-
mission rejected prohibition ofmargin trading, but urged 
-:~o38, P• 10. 
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brok.ers to d 1s cotll:'age specula. tion upon low margins. It also 
urged the Exchange to use its influence and power, if neces-
sary, to prevent members from soliciting and generally 
acc~pting business on margins lower than 20 per cent. Pur-
chases of stock on rmrgin were subjected to uncertain 
changes in brokers' policies for the amount of margin to 
be carried. They were at the mercy of brokel~s who some-
times became frightened at Wide cJ:Bnges in mELrket prices. 
Brokers demanded higher margins from their customers under 
penalty of forced sale of pledged securities with resulting 
losses to the buyer.~- Today, brokers' polic~~es are rigidly 
defined and laws protect customers from unscl:-upulous 
brokers. Also, there are few forced sales. 
Before 1914, there were no uniform rules required 
by the New York Stock Exchange for margins. Each broker 
made his own requirements which were based on the present 
flat percentage system. Margins were generally low. They 
were probably 10 per cent on the average. In 1929, margins 
had. probably reached levels of 20 to 25 per <~ent of the 
colla. t eral value of securities, althougp. s orne firms allowed 
customers to trade on lower margins. 
The Excmnge bid no uniform rules :for requirements:~ 
but it insisted, in its constitution, that margins should 
be adequate. carrying an account without proper and adequate 
margin was to be condemned:~ in tba. t it was not in the best 
I 
·;}6 ' p. 830. 
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interests and welfare of the Exchange. Howev•9r, this did not 
prevent brokers from exercising their discret:lon as to the 
size of the margin ani the choice of customer~:! who were 
granted the privilege of usiQ3 low margins.~:· 
MARGIN CREDIT IN 1929 
With t re expansi on of mar gin credit in 192 9, when 
speculative enthusiasm was high and margin crt!ldit was avail-
able on lcm margins, corporations, foreign banks, other 
brokers and individuals with idle funds beeamt3 the ns.in 
sources of the security market's funds • . An important source, 
at that tine, appeared to l:s. ve been loons by t:}Orporations 
from proceeds of securities sold to margin traders - a 
self-generating process. The average monthly interest rate 
on new call loans rose from 6.1 per cent in 1~328 to 9.8 per 
cent in March, 1929. The availability- of a huge supply of 
credit, much of it outside of the banking system's control, 
undoubtedly was a prinary factor in the boom r:md · collapse 
of stock prices·** Today, brokers and banks are the primary 
lenders for margin purchasers of securities. ~~hey are 
sanctioned by the Reserve for this purpose. 
It would seem to be a fair conclusion that rising 
brokers' loans, rising stock prices, and speculation were 
inextricably linked in 1929. There was, without doubt, a 
vast amount of bank credit and surplus corporate funds thrown 
*7, P• 251. 
~H~3, PP• 51-58. 
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into the market during this era. Many corpors.tions sold 
securities in an easy narket arrl deliberately loaned funds 
baclc to spe cula.tors. These corporations had surplus funds 
that could not be used profitably in their own industrial 
operations because of prevailing high prices. Today, cor-
porations use all the 1r funds for growth, expansion, and 
research. Lending money is not their primary concern. 
\IIJ'hen prices go too high, the firms e1 ther refJ:>ain from mak-
ing expenditures until more profitable venturf~s occur,, or 
else they invest their money in short-term, redeemable se-
curities for the duration of the inflationary period. 
A.s speculative fevers rose, more and more specu-
lators entered the market, bidding up existing prices. 
Their profits attracted more speculators and c~aused con-
comitant rises in the call money rates. Without these 
profits, there would have been no demand for ::Jpeculative 
funds, nor would these funds lB. ve come into the market 
without the high call rates thl t prevailed. It was a 
vicious and une:rrl ing eire le. The public and businessmen 
were oversold on the expectation that the courrtry was enter-
ir:g a golden era of unprecedented prosperity. Vast new 
issues were floated and these proceeds were adding fuel to 
inflation. Brokers' loans and security priceB climbed 
skyward. 
Although accurate figures as to the extent of 
margin trading in 1928-1929 do not exist, it :Ls generally 
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believed that thousanis of persons who had ne ·ver visited 
brokers' offices previously were actively trading on margin. 
It is possible, of course, that the greatest · part of this 
public particip:~. tion in the market took place in the form 
of outright purchases with funds borrowed from banks rather 
than from brokers. Whether this be the case or not, the 
nuniber of columns which even the smaller papers were de• 
voting to stock market quotations and the tremendous growth 
in odd-lot trading seemed to confirm the general impression 
that specula. ti on in stocks was rampant and widespread.* 
During the stock market panic of 1929, when value 
of many popular stocks was cut practically in half during 
a single day's trading, margin calls by wire or telephone 
for nargin before the next opening were the only type pra.c-
t ica.ble. So swi.ft was the decline tha. t some brokers sold 
out small accounts after only a. single, unsuccessful attempt 
to reach the client by phone. Rapid decline 1nade it impera-
tive for brokers to adopt such summary method:s to protect 
themselves. These declines were swi.ft becaus19 of the re-
cession's momentum. Once started, it was propelled even 
faster by continued forced liq uida. tion. Bro:ID~rs had to 
act quickly to protect their equities. Customers who .felt 
the. t they were given insufficient wa.ming brought numerous 
lawsuits against brokers. On the other hand, brokers who 
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gave customers too much time found that when they went to 
sell accounts, they were unable to realize sufficient funds 
to pay off their own loans. There m ve been lawsuits 
brought by brokers seeking to recover this difference from 
customers. ·)} 
This was the background. Confusion and panic 
were followed by chaos. It remained for a law to be estab-
lished that would remedy prevalent a buses. The SEC Act of 
1934 was prepared to rid the market of many of its defects. 
INAUGURATION BY SEC 
In the early years of the New Deal, both adrhinis-
trative and legislative branches of the federal government, 
backed by popular opinion, were strongly in favor of 
government regulation of stock exchanges and brokerage 
businesses. After extensive rearings, the SEC Act of 1934 
was :~;nssed and it became effective June 6, 1934-?Hf-
Section 7 of the act gave the Reserve complete 
power to prevent excessive use of credit for purchasing 
and carrying securities. It prescribed initial margins 
and gave the Reserve power to adjust margins in the future. 
Subsequently, the Reserve issued many regulations. Those 
governing regulation of brokers' credit ba ve been issued 
under Regulation T. 
*10, P• 154. 
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Section 8 placed restrictions on
1 
borrowing by 
exchange members, brokers, and dealers on all national se-
curity exchanges. Power to determine regulations was also 
intrusted to the Reserve. In due time, the Reserve issued 
a number of regulations under Regulation u. 
Prior to the SEC Act of 1934, credit extended by 
a member firm of the New York Stock Exchange was ruled only 
by the Exchange's minimum maintenance requirements which 
were 30 per cent of the debit balance and each firm's indi-
vidual policy. There was no uniform policy for all firms. 
No single policy was maintained constantly by an individual 
firm. This lack of uniformity in requirements and in their 
application, along with the general conditions of the time, 
demanded as many safeguards as possible for the investing 
public and pointed the way for government regulation of se-
curity market credit. Today, firms have different require-
ments, but they must meet the uniform, minimum requirements 
of the New York Stock Exchange and the Reserve. 
The SEC Act authorized the Reserve to fix the amount 
of credit allowed on initial purchases of stock registered on 
the national exchanges. Margins could be lowered wh~n neces-
sary or appropriate for accommodation of commerce and industry, 
with due regard for general credit c cnditions of the country, 
and could be raised when credit in the market was deemed 
excessive. 
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Member firms may not hypothecate customers' se-
curities in any way that would result in these securities 
being commingled with other custoners 1 securities. Written 
consent of customers involved in the transaction must be 
obtained to accomplish this. Furthermore, customers' se-
curities may not be commingled with those of someone else 
not in a similar status, nor can customers 1 securitie~ be 
hypotbe cated for a sum in excess of their in:l.ebtedness to 
the broker in relation to the securities. 
ORIGINAL FORMUIA 
The Reserve adopted the formula stated in the law 
for initial expansion of credit by brokers and dealers in 
securities. Either 55 per cent of the current market price 
of the security sime July 1, 1933, but not more than 75 
per cent of the current market price were the original rules 
for credit stock pur chases. 
This ate. tutory margin formula we.s be. sed on the 
theory that it was wise to provide for constant increase 
of restraining influences as prices of stocks advanced 
above their lows. As long as a stock price was less than 
133 per cent of low price in the period prescribed, a cus-
tomer might borrow as much as 75 per cent of its market 
price. Up to tba t point, 75 per cent of its market price 
would not exceed 100 per cent of its low price. When the 
price of a security advanced above 133 per cent of its low 
59 
price, the amount that could be borrowed on it did not in-
crease ar:rl the percentage margin requirement;, therefore, 
increased as price advanced. 
Under the statutory formula, this condition con-
tinued until price rose above 182 per cent of its low. At 
this point, a constant 45 per cent margin requirement became 
effective. The reason tm t the si tua.t ion changed at 182 per 
cent was that 55 per cent of 182 per cent was 100 per cent. 
At prices above 182 per cent of the low, a loan of 55 per 
cent of market price would be more than a loan of 100 per 
cent of the low, and therefore would be the alternative 
chosen as basis for calculating margin requirements and loan 
values. 
When the regulation went into effect on October 1, 
1934, stock price averages were relatively low. Do:w Jones' 
industrials were at 90.4 and the general effect of the regu-
lation was slight since it increased margin requirements, on 
the average, to only about 28 per cent. One effect of the 
forrm.1la was that during the pr i ce rise of a security from 
133 per cent to 182 per cent of the low, no additional 
a mount could be borrowed on the security. Consequently, 
profits from the rise could not be withdrawn and used for 
additional borrowing. The level between 133 and 182 per 
cent became known as the anti pyramiding zone. Pyramiding 
is using paper or unrealized profits in stock transactions 
as margin for further commitments. Margin traders still 
utilize this factor in trading today. 
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When a price rise carried a stock above 182 per 
cent of its low, each addi tiona 1 $1 advance enabled the 
borrower either to withdraw 55 per cent of the profits or 
to use that amount as margin for future transactions. It 
was estimated at year's end in 1935 when Dow Jones' in-
dustrials were at 144 that margins required on active issues 
averaged a bout 40 per cent, as a result of advances in stock 
prices. 
During the advance, profit pyramiding was not 
possible for most stocks, but price rises brought increasing 
numbers to levels at which pyramiding with 45 per cent margins 
was again possible. On February 1, 1936, margins on securi-
ties which had risen the most in price were raised to 55 per 
cent of the market price. On April 1, 1936, the flat 55 per 
cent requiren;J.ent was adopted by the Reserve for all purchases. 
No changes were made during the rising market of 1936 because 
the Reserve believed that there was not an extensive amount 
of credit in the market. In the fall of 1937, margin re-
quirements were lowered to 40 per cent. 
CRITICS OF THE 100 PER CENT MARKET 
Margins were changed infrequently until 1946 when 
a lasting bull market caused them to be raised . to an unpre-
cedented high of 100 per cent. Margin transactions were 
virtually eliminated by this measure. In the fall of the 
year, the stock me. rket suffered a severe and prolonged 
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decline. The Reserve, because of its margin policy, was 
subject to severe criticism. 
This policy was directly charged with being a 
primary contributing factor to the stock market 1 s decline. 
Critics felt that the law did not allow or authorize use of 
margin control for purposes of permanently prohibiting 
brokers' loans to customers. 'l'hey also believed that there 
was little excuse for using maximum permissible restraint 
on a selective basis in the area where they felt unhealthy 
expansion was on a minor plain. i~ However, the Reserve did 
have justifiable reasons for its actions and they will be 
mentioned shortly. 
Others believed tbe.t there was no intention either 
expressed or implied forrw.lly or in law the. t gave the Reserve 
power to use margins as instruments to deal with the country's 
general inflationary forces or even to control the more narrow 
area of stock n:e.rke t credit. ?HI- This power, however, was ex-
pressly granted by the SEC Act of 1934. The Reserve based 
its decisions upon the effects of inflationary forces that 
were at work within the economy. 
Other critics felt that the 100 per cent margin 
hampered reconversion and favored unlisted securities. Such 
provisions were felt to be discriminatory toward listed se-
curities and restricted the flow of investments that were 
*33, P• 1617. 
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supposed to be so vital to America's economic system. In 
addition, the 100 per cent margin was accused of being a 
deterrent to expension, production and pros-perity. 
Many observers felt that the Reserve's objeeti ves 
restri .cted credit tret could be used to finance security 
transactions not because such credit was excessive in amount, 
excessive in relation to national credit, or excessive in 
view of agriculture, indust.ry or commerce, but merely because 
the Reserve believed that total national credit was then 
excessive. It did not want any more additions to this credit, 
no matter how small in absolute amount or in relation to all 
forms of credit outstanding. Such credit was severely re-
stricted because the Reserve believed that lower margin 
requirements would encourage people to buy securities con-
trary to the general policies . of the Reserve. According to 
critics, these restrictions had adverse effects which were 
out of proportion to sma 11 beneficia 1 effects that might 
have occurred at that time. The effect on the security 
market's health and liquidity profoundly affected the public 
reception of new issues which had to provide capital needed 
for indus try. ~~ 
President Schram of the New York Stock Exchange 
felt that stock trading volume on the Exchange in 1946 had 
been slightly larger than in 1945, but there were indications 
that qualities of marketability, continuity and stability 
-:t-30, P• 8. 
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of securities were impaired by the Reserve's actions. He 
felt that the 100 per cent rre.rgin was unfair since the 
securities on the Exchange were outstanding in their res-
pective fields, bore great intrinsic value, and were known 
publicly. Also, he felt tll...a.t people were being driven from 
the market into less regulated areas where vital infor-
mation was not disclosed·* 
- Many of these demands for restoration of margin 
tradir:g came from small buyers who wanted to get into the 
market with surplus funds made a va ila ble through the war. 
In addition, brokers wanted increased fees and interest 
payments that al!'e attached to margin accounts. 
FA CTORS WITHIN THE ECONOMY 
The Reserve preferred to trust to its own devices 
rather than to heed advice from many ttexperts.u The year 
1946 was a perilous t ime for the nation. World War II had 
only recently ended and there was a backlog of suppressed 
consumer demand. Huge amounts of savings th.a t had been 
accumulated during the war were available. Investors and 
economists were both forecasting the future outlook of' 
business. Many economists had predicted vast unemployment 
with the curtailment of war-time production and return of' 
over 10,000,000 men and women from the armed forces. Others 
forecasted a business recession and lower stock prices 
within a. year. 
-lt-28, p. 1649. 
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In the spring and summer of 1946, purchases in 
the market were made largely by inexperienced people with 
new funds. They hoped to make even greater returns on their 
war savings than they had made with bank interest. New 
issues doubled or tripled in price for no apparent reason. 
The market collapsed when the tremendous backlog 
of unfilled demands couldn't be ret due to slowdowns in re-
conversion. To meet the emergency of war, the country had 
mobilized quickly, but there was no such pressing emergency 
for demobilization. Material shortage;.::~ increased as pro-
duction failed to keep pace with demand. Strikes occurred 
as men who had been reluctant to strike during war found 
the time most expedient for airing their grievances. Labor, 
in many cases, proved to be inefficient in the production 
of new consumer goods. :Machinery which :b-.e.dn' t been replaced 
for the duration suddenly broke down and had to be replaced. 
Supply collapsed before the unrelenting onslaughts of demand. 
It was in this prevailing atmosphere that margins 
were increased to 100 per cent. What might have happened if 
they had not beEm .. raised is certainly questionable. How-
ever, it seems reasonable to assume that this was a benefic~al 
move in view of the circumstances. It seems likely that high 
rrs.rgins helped to limit stock price rises during the first 
half of the year apd contributed stability to the market. 
If there had been lower margin.S, the bre!:ik in the fall of 
the year might mve been even more severe. 
65 
When the market broke sharply~ a storm of ~otest 
arose against retention of the 100 per cent rule which had 
been in effect since January. It was argued that with stock 
prj_ces receding~ c r edit's brake should be released. The 
Reserve felt tbat the time was not opportune for encouraging 
new issues for productive purposes since the scarcity of 
labor and materials~ added to lower margins~ would only have 
contributed to the inflationary pressure. 
In view of sUbsequent developments~ the position 
take n by the Reserve seems to have been vindicated. Policy 
with respect to margin requirements should be based upon 
judgment as to its broad economic effects under prevailing 
co nditions. The level or direction of stock market quota-
tions and the pleas of those unable to see the whole picture 
and who stood to gain the most from a relaxation of controls 
should not be eons idered. * 
REDUCTION IN REQUIREMENTS 
In February~ 1947~ the Reserve reduced margins to 
75 per cent. Returns to brokers' hands of stock certificates 
which 100 per cent margin buyers bad put in their own safety 
deposit boxes was a major anticipated result of this re-
duction. Probably never before in the history of Wall Street 
had so few stock certificates been held by brokers. ·_A. lso1 
debit balances on which customers paid brokers interest fees 
and which had been an important s curce of income . for them in 
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the past were expected to rise as more loons for margin ac-
counts were demanded . Elimination of debit balance fees, 
in the case of listed stocks except on frozen accounts, bad 
been a heavy financial loss in 1946 to brokers, but the ef-
fects of the 100 per cent IJE.rket was not adverse to prices 
as the following Dow Jones' averages reveal: -l!-
Industrials 
Railroads 
Utilities 
July 3, 194q 
Last Day of 
50% Trading 
165.73 
60.49 
33.49 
Jan. 19, 1946 
Last Day of 75% 
Trading 
200.21 
66.28 
39.80 
1946 
HighS 
212.50 
68.31 
43.74 
According to the Department of commerce, the total 
amount of new common and preferred stocks sold in 1947 was 1.3 
billion dollars -off substantially frcm the 2 billion bought by 
the investing public in 1946, a year in which new equity finan-
cing reached its highest level in many years. This fact mater-
ially alters the contention of many brokers and writers that 
the 100 per cent margin prohibited new equity financing. Also, 
it points up the fact that condition of the stock market de-
pends more upon _the state of business and the state of public 
psychology than it does upon the level of stock margins. -l!-* 
There is still speculation in the stock market today, 
but there is not as rtn1ch speculation done on margin because 
the number of margin traders has decreased and the amount of 
credit in the hands of rna rgin .traders has declined. Specu-
lation is not as rampant _and as widespread as it was in the 
late 1920s. There are as many professional speculators in 
-~19, p. 10 
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the market today but the number of small, inexperienced 
traders who have limited financial resources and who use 
low margins bas practically been eliminated by uniform 
rrargins, broke rage requirements, and the minimum maintenance 
levels determined by the New York Stock Exchange. 
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CHAPI'ER V 
ARE MARGIN REQUIREMENTS GOOD FOR 
WHOLE . ECONOMY? 
REASONS Bl<:::HIND CREDIT CONTROLS ON STOCKS 
Are margin requirements~ as some contend, solely 
applicable to the stock na.rket or should their control be 
viewed in light of possible resulting effects upon the 
economy a:~ a whole? Is the Reserve interested in security 
prices as well as excessive credit problems when margins 
are changed? 
The Reserve believes that responsibility granted 
to them in 1934 relates to the economy as a whole and to 
stock market credit, not stock prices. Without credit, cash 
alone could and has built up stock prices, as was visibly 
demonstrated in 1946. Regulations can restrain but they 
can't ent:lrely eliminate all speculative excesses.-l*" 
\Vhen the SEC Act was inaugurated, the country was 
in the throes of a depression. The government was trying to 
encourage recovery and to prevent further disasters such as 
had occurred in 1929. The Act was designed to improve market 
functioning, not to restrict it. By attempting to minimize 
credit pyl:>amiding in rising markets and to reduce dangers of 
forced security sales, the Act made the market a better place 
in which to do business .-lH:-
-l:-3, PP• 105-109. 
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The Reserve realizes that rules applicable to 
security markets are subject to loopholes which may permit 
bank crecl1.t to get into stock market speculation. However, 
this was a calculated riskJ it was believed preferable to 
detailed rules that would impose greater impediments upon 
construe t1. ve financing. Preventing the excessive flow of 
credit into the stock rmrket through this medium is an 
extreme.Ly difficult problem with which to deal from a regu-
latory standpoint without interfering unduly with normal 
banking a cti vi ties. 
Stock market credit volume since Regulation T and 
U were imposed hs.s not been excessively large by historical 
standards, but the Reserve looks at the entire credit picture 
in both the stock market and in the economy when margin 
changes are contemplated. 
What constitutes excessive use of credit in the 
market, as well as anywhere else, is a value judgment and not 
merely a statistical computation. There are certain signs 
that the Reserve observes such as preoccupation of business-
men and the general public with stock prices and the stock 
market, increases in short term trading, and the overall 
general credit level. These signs may be the forerunners 
of unsound speculative psychology. In addition, they may 
cause adverse effects throughout the eeonomy.-it- High margins 
do help to prevent some dire effects upon the economy by 
making it more difficult for specula tors to obtain stocks 
-l~39, pp. 256-259. 
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with sma 11 amounts o!' money. The higb.e r the margin, the 
fewer the number of shares that can be bought with any given 
sum of money. 
EFFECTS UPON THE ECONOMY 
When the crash came in the autumn of 1929, 
numerous people, in all walks of life, lost all their pos-
sessions as stocks fell below the level protected by margin. 
Stock market excesses were not only damaging to the legiti-
me. te market for capital which exchanges are supposed to 
provide, but also they had serious repercussions in the 
econom~ as a whole. Widespread losses in the market created, 
nourished, and fostered discouragement, panic and despair, 
reduced consumer buying power, undermined business confi-
dence and accentuated a trend toward depression from which 
the country was barely emerging before World War II· More 
than any other forces" stock: market excesse~ and speculation 
symbolized the boom and bust features of the econom~ which 
the government and monetary authorities have oeen trying to 
eliminate. 
Excessive credit i.n the 1929 market led to up-
swings and downswings in production, diverted time and energy 
from productive activities, as many people devoted time to 
watching ticker tapes, made business over-optimistic, over-
stimul.atea prcrlucti on, and resulted in issuance of new 
securities that caUS:e:d: overcapitalization for many firms. 
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It also led to business failures, loss of jobs, and the 
stagnation of the economy. 
Credit controls ar•:: aimed a. t these abuses. 
Without margin control, a return to the tragic times of the 
late 1920s and early 1930s would be possible~ Is is doubt-
ful, however, that such dire results could occur in the 
economy .today due to enforcement of minimum maintenance 
rules by the various exchangj9s and to enforcement of initial 
margin requirements by the Rj9serve. Controls have been 
changed and altered for various reasons during the past 24 
years. One rigid margin rat'9 ms not been applicable at all 
times and in all situations. One advantage to the ~esent 
sys tan is the flexibility foJ::- changing the margins when 
conditions so warrant a change. 
BACKGROUND SURROUNDING CHANGES IN MARGIN ~UIREMENTS-1934-1945 
A brief look at vaJr-ious margin requirement changes 
since 1934 reveals motives b19hind particular moves and credit 
situations affecting them. On April 1, 1936, requirements 
were set a. t 55 per cent for :a tock purchases on credit. This 
action represented an increa:3e in average requirements of 
about 5 per cent since the a.Yerage under the previous, modi-
fied version had risen to a. bj:>ut 50 per cent. The new margin 
was the same as that applica1ble to 3/4 of exchange trading. 
Stock market credit had been advancing and there had been 
some degree of growth in credit used for speculative 
activity. 
In November, 1g37, requirements were reduced to 
40 per cent. It was readily apparent that the progress of 
economic recovery had been suffering an interruption. Se-
curity offerings in the third quarter of 1937 were the 
smallest since the revival of activity in the security market 
early in 1935. Total corporate offerings were about 400 
million dollars com~ red with 7.60 million in the preceding 
quarter, and 970 million in the first quarter of the year. 
Prices of securities and commodities had declined sharply. 
Brokers' loans had reached their lowest level in two years, 
while debit balances wel"e off by 20 per cent from their 
,April level. 
Eight years later, on February 5, 1945, require-
ments were increased to 50 per cent. This was the first 
change within this time period. Stock prices had risen to 
new levels, volume of trading was above norrml, and stock 
market credit volume had increased. The proportion of 
margin trading had risen with sharp advances in the stock 
market an:l there had been an increase in the number of 
shares carried in margin accounts. 
The Reserve considered that this upward trend and 
increased activity warranted an additional increase in mar-
gins to 75 per cent, just five short months later in July. 
Rules applicable to margin account withdrawals were also 
tightened since all sales in undermargined accounts had to 
be applied to reduce debit balances to the extent necessary 
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to bring margin up to standard. This rule was called the 
"incidental squeeze" and was credited with reducing out-
ste.nding stock market credit from 1945 through 1946. 
BACKGROUND SURROUNDING CHANGES IN MARGIN REQUIEEMENTS 1946-1958 
on January 21, 1946, margins were raised to 100 per 
cent. Inflationary pressure within the economy caused by the 
end of the war and release into the hands of consumers of 
savings caused this increase. The Reserve believed that this 
action would only have a limited effect upon the economy as 
a whole. It felt obligated to impose restrictions in order 
to protect the natio~~l economy from the dangers of inflation, 
no matter how small t ihat danger might appear to be and no 
matter how small the amount of credit in the stock _market 
might appe a r to be compared with other credit outstanding. 
Reduction to 75 per cent followed in February, 
1947. Stock prices hu.d declined materially and stock market 
credit volume had alst' been reduced substantially. Credit 
used for carrying securities was at its lowest level in 
thirty years. 
On April 1, 1948, the Reserve relaxed its with-
drawal rules and permj_tted _ customers to make substitutions 
on the same day in undermargined accounts, in cases where 
the r e was no increase in total holdings or in total credit. 
One year later, the "' :lncidental squeeze" was eliminated and 
the 1938-1945 withdrav< a l rule was restored. This allowed 
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the customer, upon sale of his security, to withdraw margin 
required for the security's purchase. 
On January 17, 1951, even though total stock market 
credit had not a. ssumed heavy proportions, margins were raised 
to 75 per cent. During the preceding months, credit and 
trading volume as well as securities' prices had increased. 
Expanding business activity and general economic conditions 
appeared to be encouraging stock market activity and specu-
lation. The Reserve felt that further price advances, 
supported by stock market credit, were possible. Also, the 
Korean War had caused prices to rise in other areas and in-
flationary far>ces were at work within the economy. With 
moderation in these pressures and no substantial increase 
in market credit, requirements were reduced to 50 per cent 
in 1953. 
on January 4, 1955, margins were again raised to 
60 per cent. During the latter part of 1954, the economy 
had begun a recovery from the recession that bad prevailed 
during 1953. This upturn was accompanied by marked increases 
in stock rra.rket activity. Trading volume had reached its 
highest level in recent years and stock market credit had 
risen substantially. Three months later, this requirement 
was increased to 70 per cent due to further credit growth 
in the market. 
on January 15, 1958, the Reserve reduced margins 
to 50 per cent. The change was made because stock market 
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credit outstanding was not considered to be excessive and 
it had declined steadily since July, 1957. The Reserve 
felt that the market for stocks might broaden and bUsiness 
might be encouraged to raise new money for plants and equip-
ment. In December, 1955, the postwar peak in credit was 
reached at a figure of 4.03 billion dollars for customer 
cr edit and 2.2 billion dollars for broker-dealer credit. 
Figures in July, 1957 were 4.004 billion dollars for cus-
tomer credit and 2.1 billion for broker-dealer credit. 
Personal income for December, 1957 was 2 1/2 billion dollars 
below that of November, 1957 and industrial production 
drop ped to its lowest point since the nationwide steel strike 
of 1956·* 
There have been frequent changes in maFgin require-
ments in recent years,but each time a change was made the 
Reserve tried to act in behalf of the best interests of 
ever yone concerned. It will take time to see if the latest 
change ha:.s any beneficial effect upon the economy. Permit-
ting people to buy on credit doesn't mean that they will 
automatically do so, however, since there must be sufficient 
reason for them to buy stocks whether or not margins are low. 
SUGGESTED I MPROVEMENTS A~~ MODIFICATIONS 
Margin requirements have been changed at the 
Reserve'd discretion. Perhaps they have not always been 
changed as rapidly as people desired in view of surrounding 
*25 
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circumstances~ but no one denies the Reserve's sincere efforts 
to·m9.ke right decisions to the best of their ability. 
Many suggestions have been made for margin require-
ments modification in order to bring them more in line with 
popular opinion. There have been several suggest ions for 
more flexible control over margins. 
One proposal was to raise margins on any stock on 
a showing tba.t such action was in the public interest. 
Authorities would rely on dealing with isolated situations 
without affecting the stock rmrket as a whole. Another pro-
posal was to apply an amortization principle to loans on 
sec uri ties. A schedule of repayments would be required of 
the general public who borrow on securities~ but not of 
investment bankers, brokers, dealers and professional traders 
who do tbe same thing. olE-
Determining if an action was in the public interest 
would be strictly a. value judgment a rn would not be too radi-
cal a departure from the present situation. At the present 
time the Reserve does the same thing for the whole market 
ins tea.d of for i :rrli vidual stocks. Scheduling repayments 
would not only involve additional clerical work, but also 
would actually be discriminatory toward margin buyers 
compared with other credit users within the market. 
Other proposals have mentioned abolishing margin 
trading, limiting credit extended to margin buyers to a 
*2, PP• 700-719. 
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greater degree than already in existence, controlling margin 
buying via high call money rates, prohibitive taxing for 
rmrgin transactions, shorten ing the trading day, elimina-
ting and curtailing small margin traders, and, finally, 
basing margins on corporate earnings. 
Specula tors could still find a way to get money 
into the market if margins were abolished. In 1946 there 
were no margins and speculators s ti 11 entered the market on 
a cash basis. Credit is still permitted in purchases for 
other commodities today in connection with ordinary business 
transactions, including installment buying by consumers. 
'Why should there be permanent restriction of this nature for 
the stock market? It cannot be established that such trad-
ing is harmful to the economy. 
Concerning call loan rates, there has been a de-
cline in borrowing anyway and lcJN 1 stable interest rates 
have prevailed for many years in the market. From 1936 to 
1946, the call rate was only 1 per cent . · From 1946 to 1950 
it ranged between 1 1/2 per cent to 2 per cent. Previously, 
it bad fluctuated every day. 
Margin trading is already subject to taxation from 
both regular taxes and eapital gains taxes. Shorter trading 
days would only exert more pressure within shorter periods 
of time that the exchanges were open and there is no basic 
reform in this proposal. In addition, regular trading 
would be unint en ti onally hampered while attempting to cur-
tail one segment of the market 1 and a limited one at best. 
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Basing margins on corporate earnings would involve additional 
calculations nat commensurate with the af!lount of business in-
volved. 
In ~pril, 1956, Wall Street was seriously studying 
pos s ible changes in margin requirements. Senator Eberstadt 
had suggested to the Senate Conh'nittee on Banking and Currency 
investigating the stock market, one year earlier, that margins 
should be geared to individual stocks. Wall Street claimed 
that overexpansion affected only 100 to 200 stocks and 
questioned raises on all securities. Lower rates on less 
volatile stocks were supposed to make them more attractive 
to traders and interest was supposed to spread subsequently 
outside the narrow band of the most frequently traded se-
curities, accordi ng to the plan's backers. However, this 
new method would add clerical and financial burdens to 
brokers' margin dep a rtments. 
Eberstadt's suggestion was to be reduced to a 
formula. There would be a. basic rate of 50 per cent and 
the r ate might be raised by 10 per cent if the stock rose 
10 per cent in a month. The system would have to be adjusted 
by the Reserve to make it conform to its standards, but fast 
rising stocks would be penalized with higher and higher 
margins. If the stock fell 10 per cent in a month or went 
through a period of three months without a 10 per cent move 
in either direction, it w c:uld be cut by 10 per cent, but not 
below the minimum requirement. 
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Brokers believed then, am still believe, tha.t 
there are enough headaches for margin clerks. Refiguring 
a. customer's buying p ower while he waits demands skill at 
the present time without adding to an account 1 s complexity. 
There is also a shortage of trained personnel in margin 
departments and lack of adequate machinery to do a fast and 
accurate job. Only a limited n umber of rmchines are avail-
able and their cost is quite prohibitive ,while the functions 
they perform are still in the try out stage. A machine's 
rental fee was $ 3250 per month in 1956. -ll- It is even higher 
today. 
Other standards have been suggested. A formula 
for margins related to earnings has been offered. Require-
ments might be 30 per cent of average earnings per share 
for three past years, multiplied by 10. Margins required 
would be increased if price represented a higher multiple 
of earnings. A stock with average earnings of $ 3 per share 
would have a minimum margin of $9. If a stock sold for 12 
times average earnings, the margin would be 40 per cent; 
above this level, margin would be increased to 50 per cent. 
With earnings of $ 3 per share, the following would be the 
requirements :*·:t-
Price as Multiple 
of Earnings 
10 times or less 
Over 10 & to 12 
Over 12 & to 15 
Over 15 and assuming 
-~~37 
-lBf-12 I p • 1 EO • 
Margin Required 
Per cent 
30% 
35% 
40% 
a price of 50% 
Price Per 
Share 
$ 30 
36 
45 
60 
Margin 
Per Share 
$ 9 
12.60 
18.00 
30.00 
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This p lan would restrain a stock's advance or de-
cline; as it rose to a high level, requirements would increase 
and as it dropped the amount needed to purcmse or carry stock 
would decline automatically. There would be mechanical dif-
ficulties involved in the process, e.s well as difficulties in 
obtaining corporation's earnings that are subject to dif-
ferent degrees of change. Its implementation would involve 
many problems • 
In determining whether present margin rules should 
be changed or altered, perhaps it might be well to . ask, what 
makes one percentage more proper than another? The 55 per 
cent requirement established in 1936 was not criticized 
until the market's violent decline in late 1937. The flat 
percentage rule has the element of simplicity, an element 
of no small importance in view of the large and ever-
increasing number of securities on the market. Brokers are 
satisfied with the rules. Until such time as a new plan 
can be suggested that will please both the Reserve and Wall 
Street, it would appear best to permit the present system 
to continue. 
Uniform margins have protected the economy from 
abuses and excesses that characterized the late 1920s and 
the early 1930s. In their present form, initial margins 
have never been lower the. n 40 per cent. This represents a 
somewhat higher fi gure than the 10 per cent margin so preva-
lent when the market collapsed in 1929. Because the stock 
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market is so symbolic to the economy, excesses in the former 
are rapidly reflected in the latter. Since uniform margins 
were imposed, the economy as a whole has not been subjected 
to the evils that were a result of the stock market collapse 
of 1929, in which low margins played a praominent and dominant 
role. 
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CHAPTER VI 
WHAT STATISTICS A.RE AVAilABLE CONCERNING CREDIT 
A:t-Jl) THE EFFECTS OF JN!ARGIN CHA NGES? 
SEC STUDmS AND DIFFIC UTir IES I NVOLVED 
Vtr"hat statistics are available concerning credit 
and margin requirements? Is there any indication as to what 
effects rm.y have taken place in the stock market as a result 
of margin requirement changes? 
From December 12, 1942 until March 9, 1946, sta-
tistics were collected tba. t showed transactions in margin 
accounts involving purchases and sales of securities. These 
statistics are :fbund in the TWelfth Annual Re port of the SEC 
for 1946. 
However, there are several difficulties involved 
in these figures. In the definition of cash and margin 
accounts, there are certain instances when firms considered 
margin accounts to be cash accounts because they had free 
credit balances temporarily. Also, some accounts were re-
ported as margin accounts because loan agreements bad been 
signed by customers when the accounts were opened, although 
all subsequent transactions had been fully paid for by them. 
There were other cases in which stock bad been bought on 
margin, paid for in full, and sold as a cash item. In ad-
dition, some margin accounts had been transferred to the 
loan depa. rtments of banks so that items b ought on margin 
tnrough brokers were later sold by the banks as cash 
transactions. These figures, however, are the only data 
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available on purclla. ses and sales by margin a. ccounts for the 
four year period. Despite these limitations, effects of 
margin changes can be noted. 
During the four year period, there were only 
three margin changes and all were increases. One was for 
10 per cent while the other two were for 25 per cent each. 
The fiml change in 1946 established the 100 per cent re-
quirement. Table V shows the effects of these increases 
on margin accounts for a period of six weeks before and six 
weeks after the changes. It was con~idered futile by the 
SEC to continue the statistics when requirements were raised 
to 100 per cent. They were not revived when this requirement 
was subsequently dropped thirteen months later. 
The figures reveal some effects during the first 
increase from 40 to 50 per-cent since sales dropped in the 
week of March 10, 1945 from 4 million to 1.8 million shares 
in the following week. This 4 million share figure was 
reached later in the year just before requirements were again 
raised from 50 to 75 per cent. After this increase, there 
was a noticeable drop in both sales and purchases from a 
4 million share level to a 1 million snare level and even 
lower. In 1946, when margins were raised to 100 per cent, 
there was a drastic and dramatic reduction in purchases 
from 4 million shares in the week of January 19th to 100 
thousand shares in the week of January 26th. Sales dropped 
from 3.6 million shares in the week of the 19th to sales of 
1.1 million shares in the week of the 26th. 
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Since these figures were discontinued~ it has been 
practically impossible to determine accurately the extent of 
margin trans a ctions 1 except when the New York St'ock Exchange 
has seen fit to conduct its periodic, public transaction 
s1;udies in an effort to determine what course the market is 
taking. 
~~ile subject to many qualifications~ the figures 
obta ine d from 1942 to 1946 did give some irrlication .(Sf 
margin trading volume. Also 1 it was possible to see what 
actually happened to margin accounts after margins were 
changed. At the pres~nt time, it is impossible to determine 
to what extent margin changes affect the market as far as 
margin accounts are concerned. Statistics available today 
are for. total trading volume am daily trading volume. 
These are not broken down into a. cash and margin basis. 
Therefore~ what happens to the market as a whole can be 
observed, but effects on margin accounts cannot be obtained. 
Actually~ there is no definite way of establishing cause 
and. effect relationships at the present time, with margin 
changes and changes in overall trading volume. There are 
innumerable factors involved in the market~ apart from 
margins, that have equal if not weightier influence on 
trading volume. 
PUBLIC TRANSACTION STUDIES N.Y.S.E. 
The New York Stock Exchange has conducted seven 
public transaction studies in an effort to determine the 
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TABLE V 
Purchases and Sales of Margin Accounts 
After 3 Margin Changes For 
1945 & 1946* 
Millions of Shares 
February 5, 1945 - Date of 
Margin- Cbe. nge 
July 5, 1945 - Date of 
Margin Change 
Margins: 40% to 50% 
Week of 
Dec. Z£> 
Jan. 
Jan. 
Jan. 
Jan. 
Feb. 
6 
13 
ro 
27 
3 
Feb. 10 
Feb. 17 
Feb. 24 
Mar. 3 
Mar. 10 
Mar. 17 
Mar. 24 
Purchases 
3,011,010 
3,561,020 
5,549,570 
4,403,280 
3,113,700 
3,913,140 
3,742,240 
3,799,460 
3,202,480 
4,083,970 
3,324,560 
1,744,060 
1,796,220 
Sales 
2,887,470 
3,402,780 
5,009,440 
4,327,710 
2,955,870 
3,491,440 
3,500,000 
3,390,950 
3,147,320 
3,708,250 
4,088,400 
1,804,370 
2,129,350 
Januar.r 21, 1946 - Date of 
Margin Change 
Margins: 75% to 100% 
Week of Purcm s es Sales 
Dec. 15 2,098,980 1,990,730 
Dec. 22 1,607,980 1,555,270 
Dec. 29 1,082,700 1,008,860 
Jan. 5 1,227,440 1,239,360 
Jan. 12 3,122,240 2,878,570 
Jan. 19 4,001,380 3,574,240 
Jan. 26 106,410 1,106,290 
Feb. 2 47,500 1,373,600 
Feb. 9 31,210 756,150 
Feb. 16 23,040 565,310 
Feb. 23 28,750 632,370 
Mar. 2 33,850 669,110 
Mar. 9 19,280 345,700 
Margins: 50% to 75% 
Week of 
May 26 
June 2 
June 9 
June 16 
June 23 
June 30 
July 7 
July 14 
July 21 
July 28 
Aug. 4 
Aug. 11 
Aug. 18 
Purchases 
2,459,820 
2;,939,180 
3,391,430 
4,088,240 
4,578,640 
4,802,830 
1,332,050 
1,389,110 
1,319,390 
1,032,620 
806,470 
1,176,890 
647,510 
Sales 
2,433,870 
2:,605,900 
3,166,950 
3,644,270 
4,090,360 
4,625,140 
1,341,850 
1,419,100 
1,598,270 
1,178,730 
855,400 
1,237,090 
694,910 
*Source-Twelfth Annual Report for the SEC for the fiscal 
Year ended June 30, 1946, u.s. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, n.c., pp. 162-163. 
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breakdown between who is buying its stocks ; whether or 
not stocks are being bought on a cash or margin basis., 
length of time contemplated for holding stocks., and other 
types of information concerning security purchases. Days 
to be examined were selected far in advance by the Exchange 
to rule out the possibility of too much bias. Q.uestion-
naires were submitted to member firms with requests far 
cooperation in the venture. Some of these results are shown 
in Tables V!., VII, VIII and IX· An expJ_anation of terms in 
these account headings is mde at the bottom of Table VI· 
Margin purchases, as a percentage of total volume 
on the Exchange., have ranged from 32.7 per ·cent in 1954 to 
18 per cent in 1957. It must be remembered that these 
figures represent returns fer only two days at a time and 
cannot be construed as definitely being indicative of a 
trend in margin sales. Since 1952, they have never accounted 
for more than 33 per cent of total trading volume on any one 
of the seven given dates. This does give some indication of 
the volume of these transactions at the present time. 
volume range of these percentages has varied from 1.1 
million shares in 1952 to 4.2 million shares in 1954. 
Table VII shows percentage breakdowns for margin 
versus cash accounts as a percentage of public individuals' 
share volume. Table VIII shows breakdowns for trading and 
.. . 
investing of cash and margin accounts. It reveals sur-
prisingly that tbe iargest per cent for each year., in 
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margin transactions, was invested on a long term basis. 
This merely expresses an intent ion on the part of the buying 
public, however, and what they intend to do and what they 
actually do with their securities are two entirely different 
things. Opinions expressed in .brokers' interviews and 
questionnaires indicated that brokers view margin traders as 
individuals who are investing primarily for the short run and 
for quick turnover at a profit. 
Table IX shows what observations ba.ve confirmed 
that the margin trader is primarily in the middle-upper 
income group since the heaviest concentration of purchases 
from margin accounts was made by individuals in the $10,000-
$25,000 income category. These surveys have given a fair 
indication of the present combination of cash and margin 
accounts on the New York Stock Exchange. They show that 
margin trading is rather a limited part of total trading 
on the Exchange compared with the volume of cash transactions. 
Today, one out of every four shares bought or sold 
on the :tmrket represents a cash transacti on by an institution. 
The market is resting on a powerful foundation of cash. Few 
traders wi 11 be compelled to sell out by :rmrgin calls. The 
market today cannot be compared with the widely specula. ti ve 
market of the pre-war days and pre-war business declines. 
RESEARC H MEMORANDUM - N.Y.S.E. 
The New York Stock Exchange, in an attempt to 
analyze effects of ns.rgin changes, examined effects of 
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TABLE VI 
Cash Vs Margin Transactions 
New York Stock Exchang~ 
Public Transaction 
Studies for Five 
As a 
Dates From 1952 
Through 19 56·:} 
New Breakdown# 
per cent of Total Share 
Cash Baars 
Volume 
Date Total Total In Cash In Margin ' Margin 
Accts. Accts. 
June 8&15 '55 59.2% 35.4% 29.7% 5.7% 23.8% 
21.7% Mar.l4&21 '56 58.9% 37.2% 31.4% 5.8% 
·old Breakdown## 
Date Total Cash Margin 
Sept. 10&17' 52 57.0% 37.5% 19.5% 
Mar. 
Dec. 
18&25 1 53 61. 4.% 33.8% 27.6% 
8&15 '54 62.3% 29.6% 32.7% 
-::-source-NYSE Public transaction Studies-Dept. of Research 
and Sta tiat ica, June, 1956, New York, p. · 13. 
Public Individuals-As distinct from institutions and inter-
mediaries. 
#New Breakdown-Transactions in margin accounts which had a 
free balance both before and after the transaction were not 
classified as tmrgin transactions, but were reported and 
classified as ttcash" transactions. 
##Old Breakdown-Transactions processed through margin ac-
counts were classified as margin transactions even though 
they did not ne cesaar ily require the use of credit. For 
example, cash transactions are frequently processed through 
margin accounts. In '53 and '54, cash t ransactiona in mar-
gin accounts were not supposed to be classified as margin 
transactions but the instructions were not as sufficiently 
detailed as to eliminate all mis classifications. 
In addition, this does not preclude the possibility that 
some share transactions which still are included as 11 on 
margin 11 do not require borrowing to the full extent of the 
initial margin requirement of the Federal Reserve Board. 
Also, of course, virtually all sales in a margin account 
represent the liquidation of a customers' debit balance 
rather than an addition to it. 
89 
TABLE VII 
Cash Vs Margin Transactions 
New York Stock . Exchange's 
Public Transaction 
Studies for Five 
Dates From 1952 
Tbr ough 1956·!1· 
As a Per Cent of Pub lie Indi vid ua 1' s Share Volume 
Date Total 
Jun 8&15 '55 100% 
Mar 14&21 1 56 1UO% 
Date Total 
Sep 10&17 '52 100% 
Mar 18&25 '53 100% 
Dec 8&15 1 54 100% 
New Breakdown 
--cash Basis 
Total In Cash 
Accts. 
59.8% 50.2% 
63.1% 53.3% 
Old Breakdown 
Cash Mars; in 
65.8% 34.2% 
55.0% 45.0% 
47.5% 52.5% 
In Margin 
Accts. 
9.6% 
9.8% 
Margin 
Acct. 
40.2% 
36.9% 
-'A-Source-N·Y·S·E· Public Transaction Studies-Dept. of Research 
and Statistics N.y.s.E., June, 1956, New York, p. 14. 
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TABLE VIII 
Cash Vs ~~rgin Transactions 
New York Stock .Exchange's 
Public Transaction 
Studies for Five 
Dates From 1952 
Through 1956-~ 
By Trading or Investing 
As a Per Cent of Total Share Volume 
For Two Days In: 
Total Volume Sep '52 Mar '53 Dec '54 Jun '55 Mar '56 
Total-Overall 
Total-Public Indivi-
.duals 
100% 
Cash Transactions 37.5% 
Trading -r;4 
Short-Tezm Investment 5. 3 
Long-Tenn. Investment 30.9 
Margin Transactions 19. 5% 
Trading ~ 
Short-Term Investment 5. 5 
Long-Term Investment 11.1 
100% 
61.4% 
33.8% 
2:'! 
6.1 
25.6 
27.6% 
~ 8.o 
14.6 
100% 
62.3% 
29.6% 
~ 
6.1 
25.6 
32.7% 
8:-o 
11.4 
13.3 
100% 
59.2% 
35.4% 
3:"! 
8.1 
24.2 
23.8% 
b:-4 
8.7 
9.7 
lOO% 
58.9% 
3'7.2% 
3."! 
8.1 
26.0 
2~:h% 
7.5 
9.'7 
Percentage Distribution of Margin 
Transactions 
Total 
Trading 
Short-Term Investment 
Long-Term Investment 
100% 
1'4.7 
28.4 
56.9 
100% 
'I"B71 
29.1 
52.8 
100% 
2475 
34.9 
40.6 
100% 
2~ 
36.5 
40.8 
-~source-N·Y·S·E· Public 'l'ransaction Studies - Dept. of Research 
and Statistics, N·Y·S·E· ·~ June, 1956, New York, p. 15. 
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TABlE IX 
Cash Vs Margin Transactions 
New York Stock Exchange's 
Public Transaction 
Studies . for Five 
Dates From 1952 
Through 19 56* 
By Income Groups 
As a Per Cent of Total Share Volume 
For Two Days In: 
Estimated 
Annual 
Income Sep '52 Mar '53 Dec '54 Jun '55 
Total Volume 
Tot al-Public 
Ind ividua 1.s 
Cash 
Under $5~000 
15,000-$10 ,ooo 10,000-$25,000 25,000 & Over 
Margin 
Under $5,000 
$5,000-$10,000 
$10,000~$25,000 
$25,000 & Over 
100% 100% 
57.0 61.4 
37.5 33.8 
3.7 3.4 
9.6 8.9 
11.6 10.6 
12.6 11.0 
19.5 27.6 
1.3 1.8 
5.3 7.2 
6.1 10.3 
6.8 8.3 
100% 100% 
62.3 59.2 
29.6 35.4 
2.7 2.4 
8.0 9.1 
9.0 12.0 
9.9 11.8 
32.7 23.8 
1.7 1.0 
8.5 6.0 
11.9 9.3 
10.5 7.6 
Mar '56 
100% 
2.3 
10.2 
12.8 
11.9 
21.7 
0.7 
5.0 
8.5 
. 7. 5 
-l~Source-N.y.s.E. Public Transaction Studies - Dept. of Research 
and Statistics, N.·Y·S·E· June, 1956, New York, p. 16. 
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ma rgin increases since 194 5. Results were disclosed in 
Economic Research Memorandum C-3 dated Apri 1 5, 1957. The 
Exchange was primarily concerned with increases in margins, 
not decreases, so its statistics are somewha. t biased in 
this respect. It is easy to say that volume bas changed 
when rna rgins were changed, rut at the same time effects of 
other factors must be considered and evaluated. These 
other factors will be discussed shortly. 
The Exchange's comparison was based on series of 
six-month J;:eriods before ar4_ after margin increases. They 
were cone erned with stock market volume, credit, and prices. 
There was generally a lag in trading volume after margin 
increases but then a drop occurred. The Exchange claimed 
that low volume caused by the increases seriously affected 
the market's liquidity and this, in turn, affected cor-
porations' willingness and ability to raise equity capital. 
Table X shows effects of margin changes upon 
total volume since 1936. These figures were taken from 
total volume figures supplied by the Exchange. Generally, 
when margins were increased, total volume declined, but 
in some months total volume did regain and even surpass 
existing figures at the time of the dlan ge. When margins 
were reduced, there was also some reduction in total 
volume. This indicates tha. t there were other factors :1 
apart from margins, affecting the market. 
In February, 1945, margins increased from 40 per 
cent to 50 per cent. Volume declined from 32.6 million 
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shares to 27.5 million shares in the next month. This was 
followed by an increase to 41.3 million shares in the 
fourth month following the increase# but then the market 
slipped off to 21.7 million she.res in the next two months. 
In Jul~-# 1945, margins were increased to 75 per 
cent, but volume still rose from 20 million to 51.5 million 
shares six months Ja ter. This was the highest trading 
volume that the market red experienced since 1939 and,in-
cidehtally, was the month in which margins were raised to 
100 per cent b y the Reserve. Volume dropped off consider-
ably after the 100 per cent requirement change until it 
reached only 20 million shares# six months after the increase. 
Prices still remained high even though volume dropped off. 
It took four years for volume to approach that of 
January, 1946 and in December, 1950 volume stocd at 59.8 
million shares. In the next month, when requirements were 
raised to 75 per cent# volume was 70.2 million shares. This 
was the highest monthly volume figure since 1933 and this 
figure was topped in December, 1955# when the total trading 
volume reached 76.5 million shares with margins set at 70 
per cent. 
The Exchange says that margin increases have had 
little effect upon rna rket credit and this is pretty well 
borne out by Table XII, which shows effects of margin 
changes upon customers' net debit balances since 1936. 
The most drastic change was in 1946, when there was a 
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TABLE X 
New York Stock Exchange Monthly 
Reported Stock Volume and Mar~in 
l'feciuirement Cnanges Sj_nc e 193 -lr 
A~.l Nov.l Feb.5 Jul.5 Jan.21 Feb.l 
1936 1937 1945 1945 1946 1947 
Margin Change 
6th month prior 
5th month prior 
4th month prior 
3rd month prior 
2nd month ~i or 
1st month prior 
46.7 
57.5 
45.6 
67.2 
60.9 
51.0 
Month of Action 39.6 
1st month after 
2nd month after 
3rd month after 
4th month after 
5th month after 
6th month after 
20.6 
21.4 
34.8 
26.6 
3().9 
44.0 
-- Millions of 
18.5 20.8 
16.4 15.9 
20.7 17.5 
17.2 18.0 
33.9 31.3 
51.1 39.0 
29.2 
28.4 
2~.2 
14.5 
23.0 
17.1 
14.0 
27.5 
28.3 
32.0 
41.3 
20.0 
21.7 
Sb.a.res--
39.0 
32.6 
27.5 
28.3 
32.0 
41.3 
21.7 
2:5 .I: 
35.5 
40.4 
34.2 
51.5# 
20.0 
21.7 
25.1 
35.5 
40.4 
34.2 
34.1 
25.7 
31.4 
30.4 
21.7 
20.6 
20.8 
43.5 
30.4 
23.8 
29.8 
23.6 
19.3 
20.6 
20.6 
17.5 
25.5 
14.2 
Date of 
change 
Mar.30 Jan.l7 Feb.20 Jan.4 Apr.23 
1949 1951 1953 1955 1955 
Margin Change 
6th month prior 
5th month prior 
4th month prior 
3rd mont h prior 
2nd month prior 
1st month prior 
Month of .A-ction 
1st month after 
:end month after 
3rd month after 
4th month after 
5th month after 
6th month after 
17.6 
20.4 
28.3 
28.0 
18.8 
17.2 
21.1 
19.3 
18.2 
17.8 
18.8 
21.8 
23.8 
--Millions 
44.5 
38.5 
38.6 
48.4 
43.1 
59.8/1# 
70.2x 
41.2 
35.6 
34.3 
38.5 
27-4 
28.0 
o:ff' Shares--
20.9 51.9 
24.1 57.0 
26.0 41.2 
30.2 44.2 
40.5 63.9 
34.1 76. 5xx 
30.2 
42.5 
~4-4 
25.8 
26.1 
22.2 
23.9 
74.6 
60.8 
66.9 
53.8 
45.4 
58.1 
48.5 
44.2 
64.0 
76.5 
74.7 
60.8 
66.9 
53.8 
45.4 
58.1 
48.5 
41.8 
60.1 
42.2 
*Source-New York Stock Exchange MontblyReported Stock Volume 
1931-1956. 
#H igre st Volume Since Sept ember, 1939 
##Highest Volurre Sine e July, 1945 
xHighest Volume Since July, 1933 
xxHighest Volume Since July, 1933. 
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TABLE XI 
Average Dail;[ Stock V~_lume a.nd 
Changes in Margin Requirements 
Since 1936* 
Date of Apr.l · Nov .1 Feb.5 July 5 Ja.n. 21 Feb.l 
Change 1936 1937 1945 1945 1946 1947 
Margin Cba.ns; e 55% 40% 50% 75% 100% 75% 
--Millions of Shares--
6th month prior 1.9 0.9 0.9 1.6 0.9 0.9 
5th month prior 2.8 0.7 0.7 1.6 1.2 2.2 
4th month prior 2.0 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.5 1.3 
3rd month p:>i or 2.8 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.8 1.2 
2nd month prior 2.9 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.3 
1st month prior 2.1 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.0 
Month of Action 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.0 2.2 1.2 
1st month after .9 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.9 0.8 
2nd month a. fter .9 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.9 
3rd month after 1.4 0.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 0.9 
4th month after 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.2 0.8 
5th month after 1.3 0.8 1.7 2.0 1.3 1.2 
6th month after 1.9 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.0 0.7 
Da.te of Ma.r. 30 Jan.l7 Feb.20 Ja.n. 4 Apr.23 
cna.n~e 1949 1951 1953 1955 1955 
Margin Cbs.~ 50% 75% 50% 60% 70% 
--Millions of Shlres--
6th month prior u.s 2.0 1.0 2·6 2.8 
5th month prior 0.9 1.7 1.1 2.4 3.4 
4th month prior 1.4 2.1 1.2 2.0 3.6 
3rd month prior 1.2 1.9 1.8 2.1 3.3 
2nd month prior 0.8 2.3 1.8 3.3 3.0 
1st month prior 0.9 3.2 1.6 3.5 2.8 
Month of Action 0.9 3.0 1.7 3.6 2.7 
1st month after 0.9 2.5 1.9 3-5 2.3 
2nd month after 0.8 1.7 1.6 3.2 2.5 
3rd month after 0.8 1.4 1.2 2.9 2.5 
4th month a. fter 0.9 1.6 1.2 2.7 1.9 
5th month after 0.9 1.3 1.0 2.2 2.2 
6th month after 1.1 1.3 1.1 2.7 2.6 
-!~Source--New York Stock Exchange and Federal Reserve Bulletins 
for 19361 1~37 I 1947' 1949 and 1953. _ 
gradual decrease in credit of a tout 500 ·million dollars 1 
six months after margins were increased to 100 per cent. 
Margin reductions have increased debit balances somewhat 
but not too extensively. 
Table XIII reveals that when effects of increases 
were checked against stock prices on the Exchange 1 it was 
discovered that in four of six instances stock prices con-
tinued their utward trend at approxirm tely the same rate as 
prior to margin changes. The two exceptions occurred when 
withdrawal restrictions were imposed and initial margins 
were raised from 50 to 75 per cent in July~ 1945 and from 
75 to 100 per cent in January, 1946, with withdrawal re-
strictions still in effect. This also indicates that 
forces apart from margins were governing buyers' decisions 
in the market. 
Table XIV shows effects of margin changes upon 
stock prices. It can generally be observed that when margins 
were increased~ stock prices continued to rise~ although not 
always at the same rate. When margins were reduced, stock 
prices generally declined. This leads to the conclusion 
that the Reserve rmy act more quickly when market prices 
are rising. Even though its requirements did not stop the 
effects of rm :rket psychology upon prices, they did slow 
prices down somewhat.-lt- The Reserve may act more quickly 
when prices are rising because the effects of speculative 
fervor are mare readily apparent than are the effects of 
*9, PP• 223-224. 
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TABIE XII 
Customers' Net Debit Balances and 
Changes in Margin Requirements 
Since 19$6-l~ 
Date of 
change 
Apr. 1 Nov. 1 Feb. 5 Jul. . 5 Jan.21 · Feb. 1 
1936 1937 1945 1945 1946 1947 
Margin Change 40% 
--Billions 
6th month prior 
5th month prior 
4th month prior 
3rd month prior 
2nd month prior 
ls t month prior 
1.1 1.5 
1.2 1.5 
1.3 1.5 
1.3 1.5 
1. 3 1. 4 
1.4 1.1 
Month of Action 1.3 
1st month after 1.3 
2nd month after 1.3 
3rd month after 1.3 
4th month after 1. 3 
5th month after 1. 3 
6th month after 1.3 
1.0 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
50% 
of Do1la.rs--
0 •. 9 LO 
0.9 1.1 
0.9 1·1 
1. 0 1. 0 
o ... 9 1.1 
1.0 1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.0 
1.1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.1 
1.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
100% 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.0 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
nate Of Mar.30 Jan.17 Feb.20 Jan.4 Apr.23 
change 1949 1951 1953 .1955 1955 
Margi n Change 50 % 7 5% 50% 60% 70% 
6th month :prior 
5th month prior 
4th month prior 
3rd month prior 
2nd month prior 
1st month prior 
--Bill.ions of 
o. 6 _ 1. 2 
0.6 1.2 
0.6 1.3 
0.6 1.4 
0.5 1.4 
0.5 1.4 
Month of Action 0.5 1.4 
Dollars--
1. 3 1. 9 
1.3 1.9 
1.3 2.0 
1.3 2.1 
1.4 2·1 
1.3 2.2 
1.4 
2.1 
2.2 
2.4 
2.6 
2.7 
2.7 
2.8 
1st month after 0.6 1.4 1.5 2.6 2.7 
2nd month after 0.7 1.3 1.6 2.7 2.8 
3rd month after 0.7 1.3 1.7 2.7 2.8 
4th mo nth a ft er 0. 7 L 3 1. 7 2. 8 2 • 8 
5th month after 0.7 1.3 1.7 2.7 2.8 
6th month after 0.7 1.3 1.7 2.8 2.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
·:!-Source- New York Stock Exchange and Federa l Reserve Bulletins 
for 1936, 1937, 1947, 1949 and 1953. 
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TABLE XIII 
Stock Prices# and Increases 
In Margin ~equirements 
--Since Early 19"45~~ 
(1926 = 100) 
Date of 
Increase 
Jan.21 Jul. 5 Jan.17 Feb.5 .Jan.4 Apr.22 
1946 1945 1951 1945 1~55 1955 
Ini tia 1 Mar g1 n 
75-100% 50-75% 50-75% 40-50% Im rease 50-60% 60-70% 
6th month prior 116.4 105.5 141.6 100.9 232.0 251.6 
5t.h month praior 123.2 106.9 146.3 101.8 245.2 271.9 
4th month prior 128.4 113.6 154.4 101.5 236.9 285.7 
3rd month prior 132.2 108.3 155.1 101.5 256.6 290.8 
2nd month prior 136.5 117.9 155.0 101.9 251.6 291.9 
1st month prior 137.8 119.2 162.1 105.5 271.9 290.5 
Month of A eti on 147.4 118.8 172.0 106.9 . 285.7 301.4 . 
1st month after 137.2 116.4 173.1 113.6 290.8 301.0 
2nd month after 143.5 123.2 169.9 108.3 291.9 325.8 
3rd month after 149.0 128.4 178.1 117.9 290.5 345.6 
4th month after 152.3 132.2 170.9 119.2 301.4 342.9 
5th .month after 146.4 136.5 166.4 118.8 301.0 346.8 
6th month after 142.6 137.8 177.9 116.4 325.8 336.2 
Average 6 months 
before 129.1 111.9 152.4 102.2 249.0 280.4 
Average 6 months 
after 145.2 129.1 172.7 115.7 300.2 333.1 
Change from f'1. rs t 
.f.l2% +15% -4-13% -4-13% -4-21% to second pe rg~d .f.19% 
~!-Source-De:partment of Research a ri1 -Statistics of New York 
Stock Exchange. 
#Standard & Poor's Dai 1y Index of 90 Common Stocks. 
##Percentage Changes Based on Unrounded Figures. 
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TABLE XIV 
S&P 90 Stock Price Index And 
Margin Changes Sine e 1936{!-
Date of Change 
Margin Change 
6th month prior 
5th month prior 
4th month prior 
3rd month prior 
2nd month prior 
1st month prior 
Month of Action 
1st month after 
2nd month after 
3rd month after 
-'± t h month after 
5th month after 
6th month after 
Date of Change 
Margin Change 
6th month prior 
5th month prior 
4th month prior 
3rd month prior 
2nd month pri or 
ls t month prior 
Month of Action 
1st month after 
2nd month after 
3rd month after 
4th month after 
5th month after 
6th month a. fter 
Apr.l 
1936 
55% 
11.92 
13.04 
13.04 
13.76 
14.55 
14.86 
14.88 
14.09 
14.69 
15.56 
15.87 
16.05 
16.89 
Ma.r.30 
1949 
15.76 
16.19 
15.29 
15.19 
15.36 
14.77 
14.91 
14.89 
14.78 
13.97 
14.76 
15.29 
15.49 
Nov.l 
1937 
40% 
16.25 
15.64 
16.57 
16.74 
14.37 
12. :a3 
11.20 
11.20 
11.31 
11.04 
10.31 
9.89 
9.98 
Jan.17 
1951 
75% 
17.38 
18.43 
19.08 
19.87 
19.83 
19.75 
21.21 
22.00 
21.63 
21.92 
21.93 
21.55 
21.93 
Feb.5 
1945 
July 5 
1945 
Jan.21 
1946 
Feb.l 
1947 
50% 
12.81 
12.60 
12.91 
12.82 
13.10 
13.49 
13.94 
13.93 
14.28 
14.82 
15.09 
14.78 
14.83 
Feb.20 
1953 
50% 
25.18 
24.78 
24.26 
25.03 
26.04 
26.18 
25.86 
25.99 
24.71 
24.84 
23.95 
24.29 
24-39 
75% 
13.49 
13.94 
13.93 
14.28 
14.82 
15.09 
14.78 
14.83 
15.84 
16.50 
17.04 
17.33 
18.02 
100% 
14.78 
14.83 
15.84 
16.50 
17.04 
17.33 
18.02 
18.07 
17.53 
18.66 
18.70 
18.58 
18.05 
17.70 
15.09 
14.75 
14.69 
15.13 
15.21 
15.80 
15.16 
14.60 
14.34 
14.84 
15.77 
15.46 
Ja.n.4 Apr.23 
1955 1955 
60% 70% 
30.13 
30.73 
31.45 
32. 18 
33.44 
34.97 
35.60 
36.79 
36.50 
37.76 
37.60 
39.78 
42.69 
32.18 
33.44 
34.97 
35.60 
36.79 
36.50 
37.76 
37.60 
39.78 
42.69 
42.43 
44.34 
42.11 
-!~Source-S & P Trade & Securities Statistics, Security Price 
Index, 1957 Edition, S & P Cotpora.tion 1941-1943.10 With 50 
Industrials, 20 Ra.i lroa.ds, 20 PUb].ic Utility Stocks weighted 
to approximlte closely the d:Jstripution shC1Nn in the weekly 
index of 500 stocks fer these 3 classes, pp. 113-133. 
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falling prices. Reducing margins does not seem to have any 
serious impression on the market. This certainly does not 
act as a major sti mulant for buyers since volume res never 
increased dramatically wb.e n margins were reduced. 
In addition to these statistics, the Reserve pub-
lishes, in its monthly bullet in, figures the. t show current 
credit volume in the stock market for loans secured by both 
u.s. Government and other ooligations. Credit is broken 
down into two segments - that extended to customers and that 
extended to broker-dealers. 
OTHER FACTORS INVOLVED 
There are many other factors apart from rmrgins 
that are considered by stock purchasers. Low margins are 
not going to irrluce anyone to buy. stocks unless there are 
indications that there is a chance for a rise in market 
prices. Higp margins will not deter stock purchasers if 
they contemplate that the market is going still higher, 
but high margins ns.y slow down the stampede into stocks. 
Margin trading is also affected by general credit 
conditions. In 1955, credit was readily available to margin 
traders even though requ irements were h..igh. In 1956, when 
the Reserve's credit policies were beginnir"..g to bind, margin 
traders found credit harder to obtain and they bad to pay 
more interest for the credit that was ava·tlable. To make 
margin reductions more e ffeet i ve, general easing of credit 
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policies should accompany them, but even with these general 
loosening policies, there is no guarantee that the buying 
public will look with favorable eyes upon stock purchases. 
In July, 1945, when margins were increased to 75 
per cent, the Reserve also ruled that all proceeds from 
sales in und.ermargined accounts would mve to be used to re-
duce sellers' debts to brokers . until entire accounts were on 
a 75 per cent basis. This "incidental squeeze" did not permit 
any substitution of one stock for another in accounts. An 
investor who wanted to sell securities had to apply proceeds 
of this sale to reduce his debt; if he wanted to buy, he had 
to put up an additional 75 per cent in cash to get a broker's 
loan. The "incidental squeeze" stayed in effect when margins 
were raised to 100 per cent in 1946. Reserve officials think 
that the "squeeze" my have had some effect upon the shrinkage 
in securities' loans in that year. 
Increase in margins to 75 per cent in January,l951, 
in the wake of the Korean War, coincided with an increase 
in bank reserve requirements, gradual withdrawal of Reserve 
support of the government bond rrarket, and institution of a 
program for voluntary credit restraint. How much effect 
each of these md upon the ms.rket jointly or individually 
is difficult to determine, but the very fact that all three 
were being instituted simultaneously may have magnified the 
effect that the appearance of only one or more might have had 
without the otrers. These factors were prompted qu.ite as 
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much for psychological reasons as for any real, anticipated 
effect upon margin purchases. 
CLOOE OF THE BULL MARKET 
In 1957 ~ there were signs that a seven-year bull 
rmrket had finally come to a close. Margins remained at 
70 per cent throughout the year. What happened to the market 
during 1957 with no margin changes'? 
The Associated Press average of 00 stocks dropp ed 
$26.80 to $154.70 during the year. Q.uoted share values 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange fell by an estimated 
25 billion dollars ·. The Dow Jones industrial average fell 
$ 52.71 to $ 435.69. Total trading volume for the year was 
559.9 million shares compared with 556.3 million shares 
in 1956. Daily average trading volume remined just about 
the same as 1956·* 
There were three broad and definite movements in 
the 1957 market. After January lst, doubt arose as to 
pros ::;acts for business. There was a hint of trouble in the 
Middle East ar.d Dow Jones industrials were off 46 points in 
the middle of February. Shortly thereafter, the market re-
sumed its advance with good news from the Middle East when 
Israel's troops left Egypt and the Suez Canal was reopened. 
Tension concerning a Third W'orld War was eased somewhat by 
these reports. 
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In mid July, industrials were only .28 from the 
all-time April 1956 high. The Reserve, early in August, 
raised the discount rate from 3 to 3 1/2 per cent. This 
fact depressed the market slightly. Discouraging business 
news and more trouble from the Middle East disturbed the 
market further and by October 22, Dow Jones Industrials 
were off by 100 points. In an effort to stimulate business 
the Reserve reduced the discount rate to 3 per cent in 
November, but there was a sharp drop in industrial pro-
duction, a rise in unemployment, and a noticeable drop in 
personal income at the same t iJ:OO. These results dampened 
stock market enthusiasm while news of the Soviet Satellite's 
launching depressed the market even further. 
There are many more factors affecting the stock 
market tban margin requirements. Although initial reaction 
to margin reductions in January, 1958 was increased activity, 
effects were short lived and net gain was small. By the 
close of the first day of trading after the reduction, lead-
ing stocks showed gains of fractions, but among the market 
leaders there wasn't a single gain bigger than 1/4 point ·.-l!-
Reduced margins are unlikely to have any notice-
able effect upon the market for the long run. Earnings and 
dividends, presen t and reasonably prospective, make stocks 
sell where they are. If people think that stocks are War>th-
while, they will r:ay the full price for them as was shown 
in 1946. If people don't like the market's outlook, margins 
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as low as 10 per cent cannot get them to buy. 
The fact the. t speculators can borrow more money 
on stocks does not make them more attractive. stocks are 
cheap only when they sell belcw what they are worth or 
soon will be worth. They do not become cheap because it is 
possible to borrow more money needed to purchase them. There 
are many things to watch when deciding the appropriate time 
to buy s-cocks. They include: raw material prices, export 
figures, production indices, and the price level. The Reserve 
can't make stocks cheap for an investor but it can make them 
easier or more difficult to acquire.~<-
Today, there are many statistics available con-
cerning margin purchases, but s:inee 1946 actual figures for 
margin trading volume have not been kept. Since margin 
trading has become a srm 11 part of total stock market 
business, the necessity for mai ntainir:g such statistics 
seems to ba ve been reduced. The New York Stock Exchange 
will probably contiinue to make its periodic transaction 
stu:iies and these results are readily available to the 
general public. St;ai tstics for debit balances and brokers' 
loans, as well as daily trading volume on the Exchange, are 
published monthly in the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
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CHAPTER VII 
VtH..A T ARE SOME OF T EE CURREN'.J!'I PRACTICES I NVOLVED' 
IN- PURCHASING STOCKS . ON CREDIT? 
ENFORCEMENT OF SEC RULES 
What are the current practices in the stock market 
today? Who enforces rules and calls plays for credit pur-
chases of stock? 
vVhile promulgation of margin rules is a Reserve 
function, their Enforcement is assigned to the SEC, along 
with all other provisions of the 1934 Act. Statutory pro-
visions on investigation, injunctions and criminal prosecu-
tions refer only to the SEC and not to the Reserve. Viola-
tion of margin rules by Exchange members or broker-dealers 
permits application of various administrative sanctions to 
the same extent as violation of SEC rules. Regulation T 
is enforced primarily through the SEC's routine inspections 
of registered over-the-counter brokers and dealers, and by 
the Exchange 1 s inspections and disciplinary actions for 
their own members. 
Ins_r;e ctions are conducted, as a rna. tter of routine, 
by accountants in the regional offices of the SEC· some-
t.imes they are limited to p3.rticular phases of firms 1 
operations, such as financial conditions or methods of 
handling particular accounts. Generally, they involve full 
smile examinations. Insi;ections are made on a surprise 
basis similar to those made by bank examining authorities. 
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These inspections are designed not only to ferret 
· out violations, but also to educate brokers and dealers in 
current legal requirements. In addition, they provide in-
formation which is useful in appraising the n.eed for new 
regulations or amendments to existing rules. Accordingly, 
most infractions which are discovered result . in corrective 
measures on the basis of purely informal cautioning by the 
regional office of the SEC· 
Since the SEC does not ba ve facilities to inspect 
every registered broker-dealer at regular intervals, it is 
left to the regional administrator's discretion to determine 
whicll firms in his area are in need of more frequent in-
spections than others. A registered broker-dealer's failure 
to permit an inspection subjects him to revoce_tion of his 
license, just as any other wilful violation of the statute, 
as well as a ction for mandatory injunction. It has been 
held that inspection does not constitute an unreasonable 
search and seizure within the fourth amendment. Sine e a 
reg istered broker-dealer's books and records are held sub-
ject to the SEC's examination, even an individual registrant 
may not refuse to mak e his books and records available to 
the SEC on the grounds that their p roduction might tend to 
incriminate him. Brokers don't complain about inspections 
because they actually compel houses to maintain up-to-date 
records. This pressure keeps brokers more alert in their 
transactions. The threat of possible inspection makes all 
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trensactions important, regardless of size. Thus, each 
customer receives better and more accUI:'ate service whether 
purchases or sales be made on cash or margin basis. 
TNTERVIEVVS VIJITH B ROKERS 
An attempt was made to determine current practices 
b y brokers for credit purcbases of stock tbr'ough interviews 
with various brokers in Boston. Written requests for per-
mission to interview staff members were sent to brokerage 
houses throughout the city. Answers were received from these 
houses and appointments for interviews were subsequently 
made· 
Preliminary investigation had disclosed questions 
concerning stock pur chases on credit. Brokers were asked 
these questions. They were either disregarded or retained 
depending upon the significance a. ttached to them through an 
evaluation of various brokers 1 replies. A large list of 
questions was reduced to about 20 for subsequent inclusion in 
a printed questionnaire that was forwarded to other brokerage 
houses in Boston and New York. The firms selected for inter-
views were chosen on the basis of their potential amount of 
margin business since a range of a cti vi ty varying from ex-
tensive margin trading to minor margin trading was desired. 
A range of activity was sought since overall techniques and 
policies were to be examined, not just policies of firms with 
a large number of accounts, medium sized margin business, or 
just a small trade in margin accounts. 
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Brokers and Office Managers interviewed were quite 
cooperative and responsive. These interviews disclosed that 
there are mamy different practices with in the trade today 
concerning the approach to purchasing stocks on credit. It 
is also :impossible to separate margin traders into one cate-
gory since their traits vary as people vary, but sorr:e gene-
ralizations can be made concerning them. 
Actually, todaytbere are three sets of rules 
governing stock pur chases on credit. The Federal, Reserve 
bs.s one set, the New Yom Stock Exche.nge bas another, and 
finally each individual firm bas its own. Requirements of 
firms cannot go below either those set by the Reserve or 
those determired by the Exchange, but firms can and cer-
tainly do, in many instances, demand more stringent require-
ments, depending upon their appraisal of their customers 
and tre future outlook for the market. 
The Exchange requires that a cust orrer open a 
margin account with at least $1,000 in his equity balance. 
At the same time, minimum rm.intenance requirements for this 
equity balance must remain at 25 per cent of current market 
value of the securities in this account. Of the firms in-
terviewed, the range of initial equity requirements ia 
from $1,000 to $5,000 for openitJg an account. The 25 per 
cent minimum maintena nee requirement ranges upwards to 50 
per cent for individual firms. All of these firms generally 
don't require any more tba.n the Reserve's stipulated initial 
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margin for purchasing stocks on credit since they consider 
that to be a.n adequate initial margin - even too high 
ace ordi ng to some brokers. 
When a. custcmer opens a margin account, the amount 
of investigation into his background varies with the ac-
count's size and tne manner in which he is introduced to 
the firm. Margin customers do not usually walk into a. firm 
directly from the street without prior dealings with that 
firm. Most margin customers have traded on a cash basis 
before they decided to go into margin trading. 
New margin acccunts are generally brought into 
firms t lrotgh contact work and personal solicitation of 
account executives and partners of firms. Once an indivi-
dual is introduced to a firm, investigation into his back-
ground consists of bank reference Checks and general credit 
reference checks, depending upon the contemplated size of 
the margin account. Some firms accept references from in-
fluential customers of lorg standing if they vouch for new 
customers. 
A person who wants to open an account for $ 1,000 
would receive different treatment and be subjected to dif-
ferent investigation than someone who wants to open a 
margin account for $50,000. The New York Stock Exchange 
. -
merely states th~t brokers should know tbat their customers 
are morally and financially responsible. This covers a 
great deal of t6Fritory. 
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A contract must be .::iigned when e. margin account 
is opened since there must be intent to deliver securities 
and money on the part of oot h broker and customer. Margin 
buyers do not he. ve to give fi nns permission to lend their 
securities as collateral in transactions, but they may do so. 
Firms generally use securities bought on margin as collateral 
for brokers' loans that they receive from banks. Th~se loans 
are used by custo~ rs to make up the difference between tm 
value of the cash or securities that they put up as part of 
the initial margtn requirements and the remaining difference 
in their securities' market price. Authority is given 
brokers to liquidate these securities, if necessary, in event 
of a market price decline. This prevents liquidation of the 
total amount invested in the securities ,since not only would 
custan.ers be Wiped out by severe market declines, but also 
brokers' loans could disappear quite easily. 
Brokerage firm employees may only have margin ac-
counts with permission from one of the firm's partners. This 
rule prevents adverse criticism that might prevail if a firm's 
employees bought stocks on margin while the same day, unknown 
to them, a partner of the firm might be engaged in under-
writing a new issue of the same stock. Action of' these em-
ployees might be just the finishing touch that would bid up 
the stock's price to the un:lerwriting partner's advantage. 
If the person buying the stock on margin were known to the 
partner, he could spare him the unpleasantness attached to 
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such an incident. However :1 many employees of firms can and 
do have margin account in someone else's name or else they 
use bank credit for the same puxpose. Also :1 many men b.e.ve 
margin accounts i n their wives' names. 
Op inions va:ry as to action taken b y margin traders 
when the,ir stocks appreciate in value. Some brokers feel that 
average margin traders use their paper profits to expand their 
holdings. Others claim that traders probably sell accounts 
out and gst into other investment opportu nities when their 
securities rise in price. 
Margin traders are c :IB.ssified as being both wealthy 
and shrewd indi vid ua. 1s by most brokers. Sore feel the. t the 
initial $1,000 equity requirement practically precludes the 
chances of anyone other than a wealthy person in the $10 ,ooo-
$25:~000 income bracket from entering the margin trade. Others 
think that margin buyers work on s~ll bankrolls and use their 
money to make a living at rrargin trading. Margin traders are 
quite sophisticated, at least in the ways of the market:~ since 
very few inexperienced people deal in margins today. The 
majority of them have more than adequate resources for this 
purp os e :~a s recent studies he. ve shown. 
- Interest rates em rged to debit balances of margin 
traders depend upon activity ar.d size of the accounts. The 
current call loan rate for bro kers' loans also plays a de-
termining role. There is different weight given to these 
variables b y the firms, with no one reason predominating. 
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rnaetive accounts are charged a penalty rate since clerical 
work for an inactive account is just as great as for an 
active one. Both types of accounts must be kept up to date 
by margin clerks. Margin accounts call for a great deal of 
supervision and declines in market prices can hurt the firms 
as well as customers because of the money that bas been ex-
tended to customers in debit balances. 
Margin rosiness carried on by the firms inter-
viewed is not too extensive. It generally ranges from 5 to 
10 per cent of their total brokerage business. As many as 
50 per cent of their rna rgin accounts are inactive, according 
to the brokers. Some accounts aren't traded for periods 
of up to six months and longer. However, firms for the most 
part consider margin business to be more profitable than cash 
accounts because of the usual size of the transactions in 
margin accounts, the frequency with which the more active 
accounts trade, and the interest rates that can be charged 
on debit balances even when they are inactive. There is a 
great deal of clerical work involved with margin accounts, 
however, but this is generally outweighed by the financial 
rewards of the margin trade. 
The majority of brokers firmly believe that margins 
prevent speculation in the market by p reventing excessive 
bidding for securities which raises their prices. Brokers 
do not want a return to the low 1929 margins which averaged 
around 10 to 20 per cent. They believe that the current 
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50 per c~nt ihit:la.l margin is quite satisfactory since it 
limits entry somewhat while still permitting sa tis factory 
activity for the margin trader. Lower n:e.rgins would permit 
more people to enter the market, blt their accounts would 
ha.ve to be cllecked more frequently to see if minimum n:e.in-
tenance requirements were being met • . High margins permit 
accounts to be checked more infrequently since there is a. 
greater distance between the initial margin and the minimum 
requirement in which the price of the purchased security may 
fall. Price declines don't affect securities bought on high 
margins as rapidly a.s those bought on low margins for this 
reason. 
Brokers feel that the Reserve's init ia 1 require-
ments reduce the number of entrants while the Exchange's 
minimum requirements ruin peoples' chances of going too far 
with their stocks. This latter rule sets a limitation upon 
activities because people must ei t ter sell securities or 
put up more cash to restore their equity balances to 
required levels, once the minimum equity level has been 
passed. 
All the brokers agree that there is a definite 
need for credit control in the market today. They are not 
dissatisfied that the Reserve has maintained strict credit 
controls in the stock market even though other credit con-
trols have been dropped. They also believe tbat the Reserve 
generally acts fast enough to c bange llB. rgins although they 
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feel that margins aren't changed quite as fast when market 
prices are _declining as when market p:' ices are turning 
upward. 
Since only listed securities can be bought on 
margin, brokers feel that ttere is no need for margins on 
over-the-counter exchanges' securities due to the differences 
in the Ill3.rket com:t;::ared with the listed exchanges 1 market. 
~ualifications for listing on the New York Stock Exchange 
are much more rigid than many of the companies in the over-
the-counterm:trket could meet. 
Brokers don't expect to see marked increases in 
margin transactions because of recent margin reduct ions. 
They believe that appraisal of stocks on bases other than 
margins would be more L~portant in determining whether or 
not stocks were purcmsed. Earnings, capitalization, divi-
dends, current business trends, and management's ability are 
mentioned as having much greater weight than margins when 
stock pur cmses are contemplated. 
Regarding the possibility of changing margins 
from their present percentage base to s orne new base, there 
are many objections. It is felt that the present system 
is adequate and quite simple to administer and to control. 
Any change would only complicate rre.tters. 
There are enough administrative details connected 
with mar gin accounts at the present time without adding to 
the complexity of their calculations. Numbered among these 
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are: Warnings to customers given at levels slightly above 
minimum maintenance levels, following through to see that 
customers ba ve complied with requests for more cash or 
securities, ! ' iguring fractions in accounts, and constant 
and repetitious checking on accounts. Machines are used by 
the larger firms in the trade ro r margin departments but 
there are d:if ficulties of expenses involved and getting 
machines to ~rform exactl y as des ired. Large margin a c-
count volu.rre is needed to pay costs for mechanization in 
margin departments and processes have not y'et passed the 
ex peri men tal stage in rra ny companies. 
Margin buying ba. s diminished in importance since 
192 9. The number of accounts and the number of margin traders 
have decreased greatly since the SEC Act of 1934, but the 
remaining margin accounts are generally pr ofi table enough 
even when not traded too actively. Machines may never play 
a great role in rrargin departments because volume is needed 
to tnY forma chine leases or purchases .and the volume is no 
longer f cr thcoming except in the larger houses. 
PRE PARATION AND RESUVrS OF T HE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Using the interviews as a basis, a questionnaire 
was compiled and mailed to brokerage houses in Boston and 
New York. 225 questionnaires, accompanied by a stamped, 
self-addressed envelope, were mailed out. Only 78 replies 
were received. Of this number, 14 questionnaires were 
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returned unanswered and 10 houses stated that they did not 
handle ITB.rgin accounts. This left a total of 54 question-
naires that had been answered. A sample of one of these 
questionnaires is shown in Table XVII· A letter accompanied 
the form tD explain the purpose of the questionnaire ,which 
was primarily to obtain brokers 1 current viewpoints con-
cernir.g margins and to see if they concurred with the Exchange 
and the Reserve in their respective requirements for opening 
and dealing with rr:e.rgin accounts, as well as to check their 
experiences with margin traders.,compared with the interviews. 
Results of the questionnaires follow. These results 
are subject to the sample's size qualification, but never-
i:iheless they give some indication of current views and 
practices within the trade. 
When checking backgrounds of applicants for margin 
accounts, firms 1 investigation varies with intended accounts' 
size. Banks and retail credit bureaus are normally checked 
by firms for small accounts ($ 1,000-$5,000). The same is 
true of large accounts. This was the case in 89 per cent of 
the replies. Dun & Bradstreet was checked in 5.5 per cent of 
the replies for la. rge accounts ($5,000 or more) and not even 
considered in small accounts. Firms 1 :t:artners and influen-
tial customers of long standing accounted for 5.5 per cent 
of remaining returns. Sources for bringing larger rmrgin 
accounts into firms were almost evenly divided between 
account executives and firms' present customers. 41 per cent 
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of Jar ge accounts were brought into firms by account execu-
tives. The remaining 16 per cent claimed other sources 
with general partners being m.med most frequently. It is 
obvious tha. t policy varies from finn to firm and this is 
true in all other instances. 
76 per cent of the replies stated that margin 
accounts are not normally opened immediately and then either 
retained or cancelled upon receipt of favorable or unfavor-
able information concernirg prospective customers. The re-
maining 24 per cent said tba. t this was generally done, 
since accounts were opened before infomation was received. 
There are many factors involved in opening a 
rmrgin account. Since the Exchange requires that brokers 
know their clients are financially and morally responsible, 
personal judgment and evaluation, as well as investigation, 
are required by brokers. Size of an account was the major 
determining factor in only 24 per cent of the cases, as to 
whether or not accounts were opened immediately. Remaining 
answers to this question were negative, indicating that 
other factors were considered to be more important. 
There is not much difficulty involved in getting 
a person to sign a waiver of notice, according to 37 per 
cent of the replies. 40.5 per cent did not know or recog-
nize the terminology since a waiver of notice might be 
confused with a hypothecation agreement, but actually there 
is a difference. A waiver of notice permits brokers to sell 
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customers out if their margin is i mpaired without going 
through the forrmlity of notifying them of this fact, or if 
customers cannot be contacted the right to sell out has been 
granted to brokers through the signature attached to this 
notice. This a greement arose out of legal complications in 
1929, when brokers sold clients out without sufficient no-
tice. Today , the y have legal permission to do so but in 
practice they make extensive attempts to notify clients and 
accounts are seldom, if ever, permitted to pass the minimum 
mainten ance level with out their being bolstered by the ad-
dition of cash or securities from custcmers. Hypothecation 
permits brokers to pledge securities bought on margin as 
collateral fC!r' brokers 1 loans. 25.5 per cent of the replies 
were unanswered for this question. 
· 80 per cent of the firms questioned revealed that 
they require the same minimum opening equity figure as tbe, 
Exchange, while the other 20 p er cent was divided between 
11 per cent demand i ng ~) 5,000, 5.5 per cent requiring $ 2,500, 
and 3.5 per cent asking $ 1,500 in opening an account. 
The minimum maintenance rule was 25 per cent for 
35 firms, 30 per cent for 11 firms, 35 per cent for 5 firms, 
and 40 per cent for 3 firms. As for the highest figure used , 
10 houses left this blank, 22 firms had 'required as high a s 
55 per cent, 9 firms md asked 60 per cent and 13 houses 
replied tmt 75 per cent was the highest figure that they 
had d ems. n:i ed. 
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14.8 per cent of the firms had forced liquidations 
of their :rw.rgin accounts in October, 1957 during the decline 
in the market. The remaining 85.2 per cent did not. Statis-
tics were not generally available for the number of accounts 
that bad been sold out in that month, but figures returned 
showed ranges. from 10 to 20 accounts. There was more selling 
of securiti.esin October, 1957 to bring acccunts up to neces-
sary requirements. The relationship was slightly higher for 
this practice than for complete account liquidations. 44.5 
per cent of the firms had customers who were forced to sell 
securities to restore accounts to required levels while 
55.5 per cent did not. Once again, 10 replies stated that 
the number of these accounts ranged from 10 to 100. 
Margin traders generally try to pyramid their 
profits according to opinions expressed in 45.5 per cent of 
the replies. The remaining 54.5 per cent answered this 
question in the negative and replied in the affirmative to 
the following one since, according to their experience, 
margin traders sell out and get into new investment oppor-
tunities rather than try to pyramid their profits. 
Margin account activity went like this: 5 firms 
said that 50 per cent of their accounts were inactive for a 
period of 6 months or over, 11 firms claimed that between 
25 and 50 per cent of their accounts were inactive, 19 
houses replied that between 10 and 25 per cent of their 
margin accounts were inactive, and the remaining 19 answers 
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said that less than 10 per cent of their accounts were 
inactive. 
74 per cent of the houses consider margin traders 
to be s peculators. The remainder do not. Surprisingly~ 65 
per cent of the replies stated that mar gin traders were not 
generally wealthy individuals. The remainder said that they 
were. This contrasts with public transaction studies of the 
New York Stock Exchange~ v.hich have consistently shown that 
the majority of mar gin traders were in the $10~000 and over 
inco me category. At the same time, 89 per cent of the rep lies 
felt that margin traders consider themselves tobe shrewd 
operators. This was confi:rmed by brokers 1 interviews since 
indiv idm.ls who trade on margin have~ almost without ex-
ception, bad experieme with cash trading before they venture 
into margin trading. 
Replies from firms indica t e that margin accounts 
vary extensively in size from $2~000 to $100,000. 29.5 per 
cent of the firms said that the average size of their ac-
counts was$2~000. 7.4 per cent claimed their average size 
was $ 10 ~000. 14.8 per cent said that their average size 
was between ~~20~000 and $25,000~ while 26 p er cent ans wered 
their average size was from $30,000 to $35,000. 11 per cent 
said that their average size was $50,000 and the remaining 
11.3 per cent stated their average size was in the $ 50,000 
and over class. Over 90 per cent of margin accounts are 
held b y men~ while those held by wo men are u'sually the .irs 
in name only and are used primarily by men. 
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50 per cent of the margin accounts get warnings 
of 24 hours, 39 per cent get warnings of 48 hours, and 11 
per cent get warnings of 72 hours or longer when there are 
declines in their equity balances and mClr'e cash or securities 
must be added to bring the accounts up to the required figure. 
Margin accounts are checked every day by 29.5 per 
cent of the firms, generally those with the greatest number 
of accounts. They are checked more infrequently by 70.5 per 
cent of the houses depending upon the market's action. 
Machines are used for this purpose by only 9.3 per cent of 
the firms. This means that over 90 per cent of the firms 
use margin clerks for their checks on minimum requirements. 
Sire e the human element plays such an important role, margins 
cannot be too complex. If maChines were used on a wider 
basis, new margin rules with a different base might be insti-
tuted more easily. 
Firms have adopted practices of not charging less 
than 1/2 per cent above their call loan rates for interest. 
This policy is practiced by 29.5 per cent of the firms. 
70. 5 per cent charge only the slightly higher figure of 
1 per cent above their call rates. 
Activity is the basic determinant for selecting 
the size of the interest rate in 59 per cent of the firms. 
The remaining houses said that the most important factor 
for them was size of the account in selecting an appropriate 
interest rate. 
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15 firms did not respond to the question pertaining 
to the extent of their margin business, 10 firms said that 
their margin accounts composed only 5 per cent of their busi-
ness., 5 houses answered that margin accounts made up only 
between 5 and 10 per cent of their business, 4 firms replied 
that margin accounts were between 10 and 15 per cent of their 
business, 11 firms answer·ed that margin accounts comprised 
20 per cent of their business and, f1.nally, 9 houses stated 
that margin accounts totaled 25 per cent of their business. 
Margin accounts were thought to be a more profit-
able segment of the business than cash accounts by 50 per 
cent of the firms because of their activity and size. The 
negative replies, also 50 per cent, said that there was too 
much handlir:g involved to make margin accounts profitable 
and that interest cl:Rrges barely covered expenses in these 
accounts. 
89 per cent of the firms replied that rnargin 
traders watch their stocks more closely than_cash traders. 
The same number replied in the negative concerning the 
question of the Fedt~ral Reserve's being discriminatory by 
maintainimg credit controls in the stock market when most 
other credit controls in the economy he. ve been dropped. The 
Reserve acts quickly enough to change margins,according to 
70 per cent of the firms, while 30 per cent state that the 
Reserve acts too slowly. 
50 per cent is a safe initial margin, according to 
59 per cent of tre houses and 20.5 per cent of the brokers 
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think that the power to determine safe marglns should be 
restored to them. 13 per cent thought tl:B.t this would make 
competition too cutthroat and would ultimately lead to ram-
pant and widespread speculation. 9.3 per cent did not answer 
this question. The remaining brokers said that the only safe 
margin was higher than EO per cent. Most firms thought that 
recent margin reductions wouJd he. ve very little effect upon 
ei toor tre economy or the stock market. 
Over-the-counter securities should not have margins 
on their purchases because their market is too different from 
the listed exchange market, according to 50 per cent of the 
replies. 29.5 per cent did not answer this question and 
20.5 per cent said the. t there was discrimination against 
unlisted securities since they could not have any collateral 
value and could not be purChased on margin. 
Me.r gin requirements should be retained in their 
present state, according to 50 per cent of the firms. 
20.5 per cent feit that margins should have different bases 
for theirdetermination. No suggestions were offered for the 
new base. 29.5 per cent of the firms felt that margins were 
not too important, since the market could and has survived a 
100 per cent requirement. 
Opinions varied ,but from both interviews and 
questionnaires it seems that margin trading definitely occu-
pies a rather limited place in today's market. Many firms 
discourage margin trading because of the clerical work asso-
ciated with it. 
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C:H:A.PTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
In 1934, the government introduced regulation in 
the stock market to prevent a recurrence of abuses that 
prevailed in 1929 and to protect all the r:a rties involved in 
security transactions. Margin trading, as ~ne of the most 
cont roversia 1 and most criticized areas within the market, 
was selected as a proper subject for social control. How 
effective have margin requirements been and what results were 
obtained by this form of credit regulation? 
An examination of the effects of na rgin requirements 
since 1934 revealed the following conclusions: 
1. As a flexible, control device, margin require-
ments are considered to be very important by brokers and the 
public. Low margins facilitate entrance to the stock market. 
With a low mrgin, a person can obtain the same amount of 
stock for less money tren he c ouJd if he had to pay cash. 
For example, $ 2,500 worth of stock can be had for only $1,000 
with a 40 per cent margin. If cash had to be paid, the full 
$2,500 would have to be spent to obtain the same amount of 
stock. 
Highmargins, backed by other protective devices, 
a ct as warnings for brokers and the public. High margins 
indicate that Reserve authorities believe stock market credit 
is too excessive and they will probably undertake further 
regulatory action to control credit. High margins also compel 
125 
a person to put up more cash when stocks are bought than must 
be used with low margins. For example, $2,500 worth of stock 
can be had for $ 2,000 with a 80 per cent margin. Conversely, 
t h e low 40 per cent margin described above would require only 
$ 1,000 for the same purchase. Pr otection for securities is 
inc r eased with high margins, since there must be a major de-
cline in prices before the minimum maintenance level is 
reached and more cash or securities are added to a margin 
account to restore it to the required 25 per cent figure. 
As a determining factor to be evaluated prior to 
the p Ut" chase of s toe k, rna rgin requirements are not con-
s idered to be too important by brokers and the public. There 
are many other fs.ctors, apart from mrgins, that interest 
prospective 1:uyers. If a margin is only 10 per cent and a 
person can oorrow money from a broker at 6 per cent :1 more 
than 6 per cent must be made on the transaction b y the bor-
rower for the purchase to be profitable, despite the low 
margin. Earnings, dividends, and management capabilities 
are a ll considered before a stock is bought. If a stock 
look s attractive enough for the futur>e, even a 100 per cent 
margin wi ll not deter a prospective buyer. 
Movement of equity p rices is determined by many 
economic and psychological f a ctors. The public still needs 
to be rmde aware of investment opportunities. While lower 
margins pro vide an opportun ity for stoc ks to be sol d more 
readily, buyers must be convinced of the merits of the stock 
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offered for sale. In addition, public offerings must still be 
made at appropriate times, regardless of ma~gins. This places 
a burden on corporate financial directors for proper timing 
in their flotation of securities. 
If there were no margin requirements and no margin 
sales permitted , all stock p urchases would have to be made on 
a cash basis. This would be discriminatory to stock buyers 
because it cannot be definitely established that permanent 
elimination of margin trading would be more effective or more 
beneficial for the economjr than regulated margin trading. To 
permit the use of credit in one area of the economy while 
denying it in the stock market, before it has been proved 
that the regula ted use of credit has been harmful to the 
economy, would be g rossly unfair to stock purchasers. Stock 
market c r edit may be p rohibited when external factors, such 
as an excess supply of money coupled with a shortage of con-
sumer goods, necessitate this action, as was the case in 1946. 
The Reserve felt that inflation wa~ an important issue at 
that tirre. The unrestrained use of credit within the market 
would undoubtedly have added to the inflationary spir:al. The 
Reserve discontinued this prohibition when more favorable, 
external, credit conditions prevailed. If credit for stock 
purchases is permitted,c!O-i!ltrol over this credit should be 
maintained by government authority because of the effects 
that its abuse could have upon the economy . These effects 
were patently manifested in 1929. 
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Stock Exchang es could not effectively police their 
own market in 1929 when no external authority existed. Al-
though they had the privilege of administering margins, 
brokers indiscriminately granted low margins to incompetent 
individuals who not only lacked the necessary financial 
backing to be -crading on rrargin, but also were wiped out 
when stock prices fell. Collapse of these low margined 
accounts accentuated the market's decline in 1929. The 
possibility of a duplication of this tragedy is remote in 
1958 since there are minimum maintenance rules and uniform 
margins to p rotect both buyers and brokers. 
Uniform margins prevent cutthroat competition 
between brokers. They must now compete on a service b asis, 
apart from margins. Customers derive better treatment from 
uniform control because each customer is on an equal footing 
and has equal opportunity to enter the market. An indi-
vidual purchaser is permitted to use the same initial margin 
for all listed stocks regardless of the broker to whom he 
goes for tl:).e purpose of making a margin purchase. In pre-
SEC days, margins varied from firm to firm. They depended 
upon the whims of brokers. Today , control for these require-
men·L.s rests in the hands of impartial and capable authorities 
on the Board of Governors. 
The simplicity of margins cannot be ignored when 
changes in existing rules are mentioned.· Pressure on margin 
clerks would only be increased if w~rgin requirements were 
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made less uniform. If these rules became more complicated, 
they would make it necessary for machines to be used by 
brokers, in place of margin clerks. Because the rules are 
uniform an:l simple, rmrgi n .clerk s can chec k an individual 
account wi~hin three to five minutes to determine its buy-
ing p ower or its relative monetary value in the existing 
market. Machines might be able to do this work faster, but 
a l a rge volume of margin accounts would be n eeded in order 
to defray their expense. Onl;~r the larger firms have the 
necessary margin volume to co ver these expenses today. In 
addition, margin trading volume has declined. Therefore, 
fe wer machines ar-e actually needed by the industry to check 
margin accounts. 
2. Stock market credit, as a proportion of the 
market value of listed securities, has declined substan-
tially since uniform margins were imposed. For the past 
twenty y ears, the figure has averaged about i 1/2 per cent 
of this total value, compared with more than 3 per cent in 
the early 1930s. Today, absolute credit oustanding is much 
less than the 1929 tot a l of 8. 5 billion dollars. It amounts 
to not more than 4 billion dollars, including brokers' loans. 
Margin sales account for not more than 30 per cent of mark et 
activity today. The extent of deviation between this per-
centage and the percentage of margin trading that existed 
i n the 1920s and 1930s is not known. The reason for this is 
that there were no continuous or exact statistics maintained 
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during that era for margin trading volume. However, because 
of the vast amount of credit that was in the market during 
1920-1930, it is ;r>easonable to assume that margin trading 
was a considerably higher percentage of total trading 
volume than 30 per cent. 
Trading has become primarily a cash affair. The 
importance of credit in the stock market has waned while it 
has increased in other segments of the economy, notably in 
consumer credit • 
3. There is not as much amateur speculation in 
1958 as there was in 1929~ . The number of inexperienced 
speculators has decreased along with the reduction in the 
number of margin accounts from 600,000 to 300,000 and the 
decline in the amount of stock market credit from 8. 5 bil-
lion to 4 billion dollars. There is no longer any wide-
spread and rampant speculation on low margins. The lowest 
margin since 1934 bas been 40 per cent - much higher than 
the characteristically low margins of the pre-SEC era. 
Professional speculation is still being carried on, 
but the most active :rmrgin traders in the 1958 market are in 
the $ 10,000-$ 25,000 income bracket. Such was not the case in 
1929. The market is resting on a more solid foundation be-
cause of this fact. People with substantial financial 
backing don't panic as easily as less wealthy individuals 
when stock prices decline. Sophisticated traders don't flood 
the market with sell orders when the market experiences a 
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slight break. The inexperienced margin trader was more apt 
to sell out quickly with a. slight dip in prices. This rea.c-
ti on only a. dded fue 1 to the 1929 c onfla. gra. ti on. 
Margin trading received much adverse publicity 
shortly a. fter the market collapse of 1929. This fact pre-
vented many of the wary from dabbling in rmrgins. Today, 
sophisticated traders use margins to make money not only 
because they are "thoroughly familiar with the process, but 
also because they ~ve the re cessary financial resources to 
protect themselves from untoward circumstances. 
4. There is more protection for the monomy in the 
. ./ 
1958 ma-rket than formerly existed in the days of low margins. 
:Marg in traders are still able to make a satisfactory profit, 
yet there is less chance for their holdings to bewiped out 
b y severe price declines. The minimum maintenance rule 
forces customers to keep their accounts properly margined 
a. gains t rapid price drops. This prevents unnecessary m one-
tary losses arid panic that might occur. It also serves as 
a buffer a gainst a rapid amount of dis tress selling. Market· 
breaks and de clines, . if not checked, can lead to lost jobs 
and a depressed economy. 
The 1929 market was substantially different than 
the 1958 market. The economies of the respective markets 
are also quite dissimilar. Since 1921 , the economy has 
grown and expanded. Were the low margins that character-
ized 1929 prevalent in today's market, the resulw that 
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could occur mig ht be even more unfortunate than they were 
in that year. This would be due to the greater number of 
individuals a r:d firms that would be affected. The public 
interest demands that adequate safeguards prevent~ as far 
as is possib Je, any serious effects that might result from 
the careless use of margin credit. Restraint in the use of 
ini tial margins and the requirement for proper coverage 
within an accrunt check adverse fluctuations in the margin 
area. Experience has shown the public that the economy 
coul d suffer unduly if the use of credit within the stock 
market were not restrained. 
5. Statistics concerning credit and margin re-
quirements are considered to be quite adequate today. 
However, there are no longer any statistics available for 
trading volume within margin accounts. These figures were 
published fC!r' the last time in 1946 when there was a 100 
per cent margin. If these figures were available today, 
they w auld provide a better indication of the actual 
effects of margin cha r.ges upon mai'gin accounts. However, 
the difficulties involved with the collection and compil-
ation of tre se stat is tics were apparent when they were 
first obtained in 1942. These difficulties outweighed the 
advantage of being able to determine the results of raising 
or lowering tbe requirements. It was possible for the SEC 
to prescribe a definition for a margin account in 1942 and 
they did so. However, brokers used their own definition. 
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~his made an accurate compilation of statistics an impossible 
task. 
The Federal Reserve publishes figures for the 
amount of credit used in the stock market, along with total 
tre.ding volume in its monthly bulletin. These figures are 
well publicized elsewhere and m ve been since the late 
1930s. In addition, the New York Stock Exchange makes rea-
dily available to the general public its figures for tbe 
breakdown between cash and margin transactions when it con-
. ducts its periodic surveys in the market. 
Never before in the country's history bas the 
public been so well infar'med about the stock market as they 
are today. People are definitely aware of what is happening 
in the market to a greater degree ~han they were in pre-1929. 
Many small town newspapers carry statistical information con-
cerning finance and business. In fact, the margin changes 
of January, 1958 made the headlines in almost all newspapers. 
When people are conscious of what is happening in the eco-
nomy, they are more apt to speak out against evils and 
excesses. This makes for a healthier political and social 
economy. 
6. Curr.ent practices in brokerage houses adhere 
to the minimum rules prescribed by the Reserve and the 
New York Stock Exchange to a more stringent degree than is 
actually required. Instead of being lenient, brokers are 
inclined to be more demanding of c1 ients than they formerly 
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were. Practices vary from house to house, but t bere are 
min imum rules that must be observed before the stricter 
rules are arbitrarily applied. Discretion for demanding 
extra. mar gin is 1 eft to the brokers. 
Large brokerage houses a ccept both large and small 
mar gin accounts. Small accounts of $1,000-$ 5,000 are accepted 
and encouraged becaus.e these firms thrive on activity and 
volume, not on the size of accounts, for their livelihood. 
Small firms discol.lr'age the smaller rrargin accounts and cater 
exclusively to larger margin accounts of $ 10,000-$25,000 
size. Commissions on margin transa ctions for large accounts, 
as well as their characteristically more active nature, make 
up for the lack of voluill9 business fo r these small firms. 
The amount of margin business a.s a. per cent of total busi-
ness for indi vidua 1 houses varies from a negligi'ble 5 per 
cent or less to a. mximum f i gure of about 30 per cent for 
the la. r ges t h ou.s e s • 
Cler ica.l work is the major headache for brokers. 
:Margin clerks a.re selected fer their facility with figures. 
These irrlividua.ls not only figure out the buying power of 
a customer's account while he waits, but also they have to 
make frequent checks of all margin accounts to see that they 
conform to tbe minimum maintenance requirement of 25 per cent. 
Machines tt..a. ven' t been utilized within :rrs.rgin departments yet 
to . a.ny large degree because they a.re g enera.lly too expensive 
and they have limitations for sue cessful programming. 
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Brokers feel the. t there is a definite need for credit con-
trol within the security industry and that present rules 
have been effective because they are simple to com~ute and 
to administer. Brokers realize that more complex rules 
would tax margin clerks too heavily. 
VOLUME AND TRADING ACTIVITY 
Tables XV and XVI reveal figures for trading volume 
on the New York Stock Exchange since 1929. These figures 
clearly disclose that the number of shares l .isted on the 
Exchange has iroreased greatly since margin controls were 
introduced. At the same time, stock volume has been quite 
irregul9.r. Total stock trading volume for 1955 was the 
heaviest since 1930, yet it amounted to only 58 per cent 
of the trading volume for 1929. How significant are these 
figures and how much bearing does margin control have upon 
them? 
Volume and turnover are very important to the 
Exchange and to its rep res en tat iv es sine e brokers' fees, 
for the most ]:l:lrt, depend upon the activity of their 
accou:ats. Stocks must be bought and sold if commissions 
are to be paid. Shares listed on the Exchange, as of 1956, 
had increased by 240 per cent while volume had increased by 
only 70 per cent. The effect of margin control upon these 
figures is hard to determine. Recently, the demand for 
higher broke rage fees from different firms within the 
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TABLE XV 
~rted Stock Volume Avera~e, 
~ and Low Record Dals From 
1945 To 1 ~56~~o 
Total Annual Average Daily High IS.y Low Day 
Year Volume Volume Vol. Date Vol • . . Date 
--Share Volume in Thousands--
1945 377,564 1422 2936 6/28 492 8/6 
1946 363,709 1370 3624 9/4 487 7/5 
1947 253;624 952 2197 4/14 476 8/27 
1948 302,219 1132 3837 5/14 465 8/16 
1949 272,203 1023 2212 12/14 541 6/17 
1950 524,800 1980 4859 6/27 1061 3/13 
1951 443,504 1674 3877 1/17# 973 7/11 
1952 337,805 1297 2352 11/19 780 5/19 
1953 354,851 1414 3119 3/31 738 9/8 
1954 573,375 2275 4433 12/29 1215 1/11 . 
1955 649 ,602 2578 7717 9/26 1230 8/15 
1956 556,284 2216 3921 2/29 1223 10/9 
-l~Source-New York Stock J:!;xcbange Fact Book for 1957, p. 25. 
#Mar gin Requirements Incr eased This Date to 75% From 50%. 
TABLE XVI 
Turnover of Listed Shares on the 
New York Stock Exchange 
1929-1956~(. 
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Year 
Shares Lis ted 
1st o:f Year 
Average of Shares 
Lis ted for Year 
Reported Per Cent 
Volume Turnover 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955# 
1956# 
---Shares Listed in Millions of Shares---
757 
1128 
1297 
1319 
1312 
1293 
1305 
1318 
1360 
1412 
1424 
1435 
1455 
1463 
1471 
1489 
1492 
1592 
1771 
1907 
2018 
2166 
2353 
2616 
2788 
2927 
3836 
4462 
942 
1212 
1308 
1315 
1302 
1299 
1312 
1339 
1386 
1418 
1430 
1445 
1459 
1467 
1480 
1491 
1542 
1682 
1839 
1962 
2092 
2259 
2485 
2702 
2857 
3050 
3505 
4149 
1125 
811 
577 
425 
655 
324 
382 
496 
409 
297 
262 
208 
171 
126 
279 
263 
378 
364 
254 
302 
272 
525 
444 
338 
355 
573 
650 
556 
119% 
67 
44 
32 
50 
25 
29 
37 
30 
21 
18 
14 
12 
9 
19 
18 
24 
22 
14 
15 
13 
23 
18 
13 
12 
19 
19 
13 
*Source-New York Stock ExChange Yearbook for 1955. 
-#Source-New York Stock Exchange Fact Book for 1957, pp. 32-33, 
PP• 11 and 18. 
industry disclosed their concern with trading volume and 
the increased expenses associated with their business. 
It was re ported that higher fees were needed be-
cause nnny firms bave not been receiving a satisfactory 
share of th:is business. Irregular trading volume, plus the 
rise in costs of doing business" may compel some of the 
smaller firms to merge in order to share expenses. If these 
firms fail tq merge, they may find it too difficult to con-
tinue their operations on a. profitable basis. It is signi-
ficant tbat only the largest firms defended existing broker-
age fees b ecause their trading volume bas been adequate to 
cover costs. 
Critics of uniform rmr gin controls have declared 
that these rules may have dampened the ardor of buyers for 
stocks. Whether or not this be the case, it is readily 
apparent tba. t the market rests ·now on a more solid foun-
dation. With the decline in rmrgin trading and the a d vent 
of the institutional inves tor, the whole structure of the 
market has changed. Institutions now account for 1/4 of 
trading activity, yet these organizations seldom trade too 
frequently because they are p rimarily interested in stable 
income and not quick turnover for a profit. It is entirely 
possible that their share of the market may increase in the 
future and cause trading volume to decline even further. 
If this be the case, t hese institutions may be an other 
contributing factor that. will force s mall firms to merge 
in order to share the expense of doing business. 
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MARGI NS AND SELECTIVE CREDIT CONTROLS 
Margins are selective credit controls. They are 
selective because they apply to a r:articular segment of the 
economy such as the stock market and not to the whole eco-
nomy. Conversely, general credit controls apply to the 
volume and cost of bank credit in general without regard to 
the particular field of enterprise or economic activity in 
which the credit is used. They include such areas as open 
market operations and discount transactions. Both general 
and selective credit controls are administered by the 
Federal Reserve System. 
Uniform margins have been effective in curbing 
speculation since their inception in 1934. Because se-
lective credit controls have been effective in the stock 
market, it is possible that they could be utilized in other 
economic areas or has selective control been effective in 
the stock nnrket merely because of that economic area's 
peculiar aspects? For example, could selective controls 
be p erxnanently utilized in consumer credit? 
Margin control ms been effective because of the 
narrow area that it encompassed. Practices within the in-
dustry are standardized and the number of brokers to control 
is limited. In addition, the constructive results of such 
control have been favorable enough to outweigh the burdens 
associated with it because speculation has been curbed, 
utilization of low margins has been stopped, and overexten-· 
sion of credit has been discouraged. 
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It is extremely doubtful that selective credit 
control could be successfully utilized with consumer credit 
on a permanent basis because of the difficulties and costs 
that would necessarily b e associated with such control. 
Evasion wouJ.rl. probably go undetected merely because of the 
lack of necessary supervision. 
Con sumer credit covers a broad economic area 
and encompasses all types of mer·chandise • . Margin controls 
are only applied to security transactions in the stock 
market - a relatively small section of the economy. It 
would be necessary to creek hundreds of thousands of firms 
that extend consumer credit ,while there are only a. few 
thousand brokers to control. Trade practices within the 
economy are not as standardized as they are in the stock 
market, while consumer credit tenns vary from firm to firm. 
It would be to-o difficult to establish a selective control 
for consumer credit that would be uni vers.ally applicable. 
In addition, the cost of policing selective controls for 
consumer credit would be very prohibitive compared to the 
po;:;sible benefits to be derived from them. 
MACH INES AND THE NUMBER OF MARGIN ACCOUNTS 
Two other implications were brought to light b y 
the study. The first is concerned with the introduction of 
rmchines into margin departments of brolr:erage firms. The 
second is concerned with the determination of the identity 
of those stocks traded most frequently on margin. 
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Electronic office machines have rmde rapid 
strides within recent years, but their cost is still too 
high for their practical use within margin depfortments. 
Only tbe larger firms, with their extensive margin volume, 
can afford to defray the e.xpens e of electronic computers. 
The cost of these machines can easily be pro-rated over 
many accounts. The smaller f:irms, a long with those firms 
that don'tbave many margin accounts, cannot afford to use 
machines to check their margin accounts because of the 
relatively high cost of these machines. Electronic com-
puters be. ve made progress in the past few years, and it is 
quite possible that prices of these machines may decline 
in the future due to decreased costs resulting from more 
standardized production. If lower prices permit more 
machines to be used, new margin controls might be insti-
tuted that could be sue cess fully p rogrammed on these 
machines. Therefore margin clerks would not be quite as 
important as they are today. Someone would s ti 11 have to 
feed dats. to these machines, but this will relieve the 
hu..'nan element of much mathematical wortc. Controls are 
simple now primarily because they depend for tbeir success 
upon humans to make the re cessar y calc ula ti ons. 
Many c l~itics also claim that margins are only used 
for a limited number of stocks - perhaps two hundred. No 
extensive statistical studies have been made, but margin 
accounts throughout the trade could be checked to indicate 
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if this criticism is valid. It seems lqgical that margin 
traders would be interested in active stocks in order that 
theymight be able to realize quick profits with the in-
creased prices of these securities. Generally, the most 
active stocks are confined to a limited number of rmrket 
leaders. If this contention could be proved, higher margins 
might be app lied to these particular stocks. Authorities 
might also feel that the public interest would benefit from 
such action. Many other inactive stocks might be traded 
more frequently if margins on them were lowered while they 
were either retained or increased on the market leaders. 
However, authorities must always be careful that they don't 
discriminate against any stocks and any companies. That is 
another reason why p resent controls have been uniform for 
all stocks. Disadvantages and advantages would have to be 
weighed carefully in the future if such cronges were con-
templated . Simplicity is still the keynote for the present 
s ys tern because of the dependence upon margin· clerks, lack 
of adequate machinery, and the bigh costs involved for ' 
machines that are available. 
Despite the criticism of margin requirements, it 
has definitel y been established that t h ere are too many 
other factors inextricably linked with margins in the stock 
market to attribute solely to this control blame for either 
.reducing trading volume of impeding stock market liquidity. 
At the same time, critics of margins mve failed to propose 
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a more satisfactory alternative solution to the problem of 
credit control than the plan currently in operation. The 
slightest change in the stock market· has had deep signi-
ficance for the people of this country in the past, and 
will continue to do so in the future. Therefore, margin 
trading is a justifiable form of social control. The eco-
nomy has benefited from this regu lation to a far greater 
extent than would be thought possible urrler the relatively 
inexpensive cost of adm inis trati on. 
All available evidence strongly indicates that 
Federal Reserve authorities have moved cautiously and 
wisely in the last twenty-four y ears since they assumed 
control over margin requirements. Their control over 
margins should definitely be continued in its present form 
unti 1 such time as a more useful method of control is 
devised. 
143 
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please Check Appropriate Answers 
1. Vfuen investigating the background of an applicant for a 
margin account, whiCh of the following references i s used 
most frequently? Small Account: ($1000-$ 5000) Bank _____ Dun & 
Bradstreet Partner of Firm ___ Influential Customer of Long 
Standing ___ Local Retail Credit Bureau Other Source 
Large Account: ($ 5000 or more) Bank Dun & Bradstreet 
Partner of Finn Influential Customer of Long Standing __ 
Local Retail Credit Bureau Other Source 
2. How are the larger margin accounts generally brought into 
the finn? By a Present Customer __ By an Account Executive 
Partner of Finn Other Source 
3. Is a margin account normally opened immediately and then 
either retained or cancelled upon receipt of favorable or 
unfavorable cred it references? Yes No 
Would the size of the account be the major determinant as to 
whether or not an account were opened immediately? Yes 
No Other Reason 
4. Is there g enerally .much difficulty involved in getting a 
person to signa waiver of notice? Great Deal __ Average 
Amount __ Rela tively Little __ • 
5. Does your firm g o a long with the New York Stock Exchang e 
on its minimum equity figure of $1000 in opening a margin 
~?-ccount? Yes No If not, what is your requirement? 
6. Is your minimum m~intenance rule the same as that of the 
New York Stock Excbange? Yes No 
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Sample Questionnaire (Continued) 
I f not, what is y our requirement'?_(This may vary with the 
size of the account, so please flll in the figure used most 
frequently.) 
~fuat is the highest figure that y ou have used? ________ _ 
Do any members of the firm have margin accounts?Yes ___ No 
If the answer is yes, approximately how many do have them? 
Did the firm l::ave any forced liquidation of margin accounts 
in October, 1957? Yes No If so, approximately how 
many? __ . 
Did many indi viduals<,: with margin accounts have to liquidate . 
securities in October, 1957 to maintain their equity balance? 
Yes No If so, approximately how many? __ _ 
7. Durin~ a period of rising prices on the market does tbe 
average marg in acccunt generally try to pyramid his 
profits? Yes No Other Act ion 
------
If the answer to the above is no, does this individual 
generally sell out and get into a new investment opportunity? 
Yes No Other Action 
·---
~~at per cent of your margin accounts are inactive? (Not 
active for a period over 6 months) 50% or more __ 50%-25% __ 
25%-lO% __ Less than 10% __ 
Is the margin trader who buys on margin with the intention 
of actually paying off the debt within a short time a rarity? 
Yes No 
8. From your experience, is the average margin account holder 
primarily a specula tor? Yes No Other Action 
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Sample Questionnaire (Continued) 
9. Is this individual generally a wealthy person? Yes No 
Does this individual generally consider himself to be a 
shrewd operator? Yes No • 
Are margin accounts generally small accounts'? Yes No 
What is the average size of your margin accounts? 
-----
Are there more men than women with margin accounts 1 Yes 
No 
10. How much warning is given to margin account holders when 
a decline occurs in their equity balance and more cash or 
securities are needed to restore it to the required 25% 
level? 24 hours 48 hours 72 hours or more 
At what minimum equity level is the firm itself warned? 
45%_40%'_35%'_30%'_· 
How often are margin accounts checked to see how their equity 
compares with market prices? Every day __ Every 2 days __ 
More infrequently ___ 
Are machines used for this purpose? Yes ___ No 
11. Vilhat per cent above bank's interest rate is normally . 
charged to margin accounts? l%' __ 2% __ 3% __ More __ _ 
(If this depends upon the size of the account and its acti-
vity, please check the per cent most frequently used and 
then check which of these two factors is the more important 
in determining this };er cent.) Size of account __ Activity_ 
Other Reason 
12. ·wnat per cent of your business is presently composed of 
margin accounts? 5% or less ___ 5-l0% ___ 10-15% __ 15-20% __ 
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20-25% ___ 25% or more ___ • 
13. Do you consider margin ac counts to be a more profitable 
segment of the business than cash accounts? Yes __ No _ Vtihy __ • 
14. In y our opinion, does the average rna rgin account holder 
watch h:Ls stocks more closely than the cash trader'? Yes No 
15. Do you think that the Federal Reserve is being discrimi-
natory by rna intaining selective controls on margins when most 
general credit controls ba ve been dropped? Yes __ No 
Additional Comments: 
----------------------------------------------
16. Do you think that the Fe a eral Reserve a cts quickly enough 
to change margins? Generally fast enough ___ On Upswing 
fast On Dav nswi ng slow Need for improvement Additional 
comments: ______________________________________________________ _ 
17. What do y ou consid er to be a safe initial margin? Do you 
feel t):;..a.t p·ro vided the minimum rna int enance level is followed, 
safety ---is inherent, no matter how high or low the initial 
margin may be? Any margin s a ~e if minimum level is maint ained 
Only safe margin is high margin _Margin around 50% is 
safe, gives activity and still limits entry ___ Brokers should 
determine safe nB rgin __ Addit ional Conunents : _____________ _ 
18. Do you believe t hat recent margin requirement reductions 
will have a beneficial effect upon the economy as a whole? 
Yes, will incr ease business activity and capital expendi-
tures Yes, but the effect wi 11 be extremely light 
' -
No, will only increase inflation Addit iona.l Comments: 
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19· Do you think that over- the-counter securities S:lould 
have margin requirements on their purchases? No, rna..rket is 
too different from listed exchange rna..rket_Yes, there is 
dis crimination a gainst unlisted securities Additional 
Comments: ______________________ ___ 
20. How important are margin requirements? Should they be 
continued in their present state or could they be altered 
or charged to rrake them more effective and satisfactory? 
Impontant but should have different basis for their de-
termina.tion __ Important but should be retained in their 
present state __ . Important but discretion should be restored 
to brokers __ Not important, trade could and has survived 
cash market Additional comments: 
----------- ----------------
21. Lower mar gins gererally mean more business for you. Do 
you think that the 50 % margin wi 11 increase this segment of 
the business very much? Should margins be dropped lower? 
Comments: 
-----------------------
22. What are some of the administrative problems involved 
in the handling of margin accounts? Clerical work involved 
Warnings to customers Follow-through to check on account 
--- --
after warning_Figur> ing fractions in accounts Constant 
and repetitious check on accounts Addi tiona 1 Comments: 
---
Any Furthercomments: 
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